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[T]he privacy and dignity of our citizens [are] being whittled away by 
sometimes imperceptible steps.  Taken individually, each step may be of 
little consequence.  But when viewed as a whole, there begins to emerge a 
society quite unlike any we have seen — a society in which government 
may intrude into the secret regions of a [person’s] life at will.1 
INTRODUCTION 
John Roe,2 until recently, was a police officer for the city of San 
Diego; that is, until his supervising sergeant discovered that in his free 
time John enjoyed stripping off a police uniform, masturbating in 
front of a video camera, and selling the resulting pornography on 
eBay.3  Not surprisingly, the San Diego Police Department (“SDPD”) 
demanded that John cease and desist in producing or distributing any 
materials of a sexually explicit nature, believing that such off-duty 
conduct not only violated a number of internal police regulations but 
also adversely impacted the SDPD’s mission and functions.4  The 
SDPD fired John when he did not completely cease his explicit 
extracurricular activities as ordered.5  In a per curiam decision from 
the October 2004 term, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
SDPD did not deny John Roe’s right to free expression under the First 
Amendment, as he was not expressing himself on a “matter of public 
concern.”6 
Putting aside the lurid nature of this case of the pornographic 
policeman, John Roe raises significant constitutional questions 
regarding the extent to which the government may condition public 
employment on which activities employees decide to undertake in 
their private and personal lives.7  Traditionally, under the doctrine of 
 
 1 Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 343 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 2 “John Roe” is a fictitious name given to the plaintiff in the case of City of San 
Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004) (per curiam).  So that the reader does not confuse 
San Diego v. Roe with the more well-known case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 
this paper refers to the former as John Roe. 
 3 See John Roe, 543 U.S. at 78. 
 4 Id. at 78-79, 84. 
 5 Id. at 79. 
 6 Id. at 84-85. 
 7 The fact that the federal constitutional issues raised herein apply directly only 
to public employment should in no way diminish the significance of these legal issues.  
There are over 21 million federal, state, and local government employees in the United 
States, who make up roughly 16.5% of the nation’s workforce.  See JOSEPH R. GRODIN, 
JUNE M. WEISBERGER & MARTIN H. MALIN, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT:  CASES AND 
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unconstitutional conditions, the Supreme Court limits the 
government’s ability to condition governmental benefits, including 
public employment, on the basis of individuals forfeiting their 
constitutional rights.8  Indeed, the Supreme Court most often applies 
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to scrutinize employment 
terminations of, or other adverse employment actions taken against, 
public employees for exercising their First Amendment free speech 
rights.9 
In the First Amendment context, the Court developed the well-
honed, if not entirely satisfactory, Connick/Pickering doctrinal analysis.  
Taken together, Connick v. Myers and Pickering v. Board of Education 
forbid public employers from taking adverse employment actions 
against employees for speaking out on “matters of public concern” 
unless, under a constitutional balancing test, the governmental 
interest in efficiency outweighs the employee’s First Amendment 
rights.10  Indeed, the Supreme Court dismissed John Roe’s case against 
the SDPD under this First Amendment analysis.11 
 
 
 
MATERIALS 1 (2004); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:  
2004-2005 298, tbl.453 (2005) (listing figures for 2002). 
 8 See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines:  Unconstitutional Conditions 
in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2001). 
 9 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972).  Since Perry, the 
Supreme Court decided a number of these First Amendment public employment 
cases.  See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006); Rankin v. McPherson, 
483 U.S. 378 (1987) (applying unconstitutional conditions doctrine to uphold adverse 
employment actions taken against deputy district attorney for engaging in 
unsanctioned official-capacity speech); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) 
(applying doctrine in upholding termination of assistant district attorney who 
distributed unsanctioned inter-office questionnaire); Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. 
Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (applying doctrine to hold that public employee may 
express her views in private to employer and still be protected by First Amendment); 
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (applying 
doctrine to teacher who engaged in protected First Amendment activity, but finding 
that teacher could still be validly fired for reasons unrelated to that protected activity). 
 10 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 143 (establishing, as threshold matter, that public 
employee speech must involve “matter of public concern” in order to come under 
protection of First Amendment); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) 
(balancing “interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of 
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees”). 
 11 See John Roe, 543 U.S. at 83-85.  Of course, in John Roe, the Supreme Court did 
not need to engage in a constitutional balancing act, as John’s conduct did not meet 
the threshold public concern test.  See id. 
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Nevertheless, the recent Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas,12 which struck down a Texas anti-sodomy statute, recognizes a 
more robust “liberty interest”13 in forming one’s identity through 
meaningful human relationships in one’s personal and private life.  
Indeed, Lawrence drastically alters the constitutional landscape as to 
when the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions should come into 
play in the public employment context.  This is because, in Lawrence, 
the Supreme Court construed an individual’s liberty interest in 
decisional non-interference in private affairs14 as a preferred interest 
that is due a heightened form of rational basis review.15  Consequently, 
a previously neglected aspect of Lawrence is that it almost certainly 
trumpets the beginning of a new era of greater privacy protection for 
public employees by no longer permitting government employers to 
terminate an employee merely because that employee does not live up  
 
 
 12 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 13 The focus on “liberty interests” rather than “privacy rights” is consistent with 
the fact that Justice Kennedy utilizes the word “liberty” much more in his opinion for 
the court than the more amorphous “privacy” language.  My guess is that his choice in 
this regard was purposeful as he sought to anchor this newly minted interest in the 
concrete liberty language of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.  
Accord Randy E. Barnett, Correspondence, Grading Justice Kennedy:  A Reply to 
Professor Carpenter, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1582, 1589 (2005) (“The fact that Justice 
Kennedy does not [announce a fundamental right to privacy] — that this doctrinal 
dog does not bark — makes Lawrence in my view a ‘potentially revolutionary’ liberty-
protecting case.”); Erin Daly, The New Liberty, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 221, 233 (2005) 
(“Both Casey and Lawrence self-consciously shift the focus of substantive due process 
away from privacy and back toward its textual anchor, liberty.  This avoids the 
principal objection to the Court’s post-Griswold privacy jurisprudence — that it lacks 
textual support.”); see also Note, Unfixing Lawrence, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2858, 2868 
(2005) (arguing that there “is a . . . strategic equivocation between privacy and 
liberty” in Lawrence to advance, “whether knowingly or not, a strategically powerful 
complex.  The two terms of the complex sustain and limit one another”). 
 14 See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 491 (2006) 
(“Decisional interference involves the government’s incursion into the data subject’s 
decisions regarding her private affairs.”) (emphasis added); see also Whalen v. Roe, 
429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (finding one form of privacy consisting of “interest in 
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions”). 
 15 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.  Although not every jurist and commentator 
agrees that Lawrence applies more than a traditional rational basis review to rights of 
decisional non-interference in private affairs, the vast majority do.  See William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics:  Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and 
Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2005) (“[F]ew constitutional scholars think 
the narrowest or the broadest reading of Lawrence is correct.  Its charged reasoning 
cannot be limited to the sodomy context alone, but neither does it entail same-sex 
marriage.”). 
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to the employer’s conception of morality in how she lives her private 
and personal life (especially in matters pertaining to sex).16 
This paper argues that Lawrence signals the fulfillment of a certain 
constitutional tradition initiated by Justice Louis Brandeis in his 
eloquent dissent in Olmstead v. United States,17 most recently revived 
in the joint opinion of three Justices in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,18 and, for the first time, adopted by 
a majority of the Court in Lawrence.19  As a result, the current 
Connick/Pickering First Amendment framework, which focuses on the 
nature of the speech or expression engaged in by the employee, must 
be recast to be more readily applicable to the Lawrence substantive due 
process context.  This article therefore proposes a restructured 
constitutional balancing analysis, the “modified Pickering analysis,” to 
more appropriately weigh the interests at stake in such cases:  the 
public employee’s interest in decisional non-interference in private 
affairs and the employer’s interest in running an efficient 
governmental service.20 
In order to concretely demonstrate how the modified Pickering 
analysis will apply to the liberty interests announced in Lawrence, this 
article revisits the Supreme Court’s decision in City of San Diego v. 
Roe.  In this regard, this paper concludes that John Roe would most 
likely have been decided in the same manner under this modified 
analysis because of heightened governmental efficiency concerns and 
John Roe’s relatively minimal substantive due process rights under the 
circumstances.21  Nevertheless, and as highlighted by a number of 
hypotheticals discussed below, the constitutional balancing of relevant 
 
 16 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (observing “emerging awareness that liberty gives 
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives 
in matters pertaining to sex”); State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 34-35 (Kan. 2005) 
(finding, based on Lawrence, that moral disapproval of group cannot be legitimate 
government interest). 
 17 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 18 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (joint 
opinion). 
 19 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79. 
 20 To be clear, although this new test is denominated the “modified Pickering 
analysis,” this test is not meant to apply to First Amendment public employee 
disputes.  For those cases, the Connick/Pickering line still applies.  This modified 
analysis is only for weighing public employees’ substantive due process rights post-
Lawrence against an employers’ legitimate efficiency concerns.  It is because of the fact 
that Pickering first established the constitutional balancing of interests in this context 
that this new test has been so named. 
 21 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
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interests in future substantive due process cases will certainly lead to 
public employees having greater legal protection from arbitrary 
interference by government employers into their private affairs.22 
This article presents the emergence of these post-Lawrence public 
employee interests in decisional non-interference in private affairs, 
and the concomitant modified Pickering test, in five parts.  Part I will 
discuss the historical foundations of the Supreme Court’s maddening 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and, in particular, the unique 
character of those unconstitutional conditions cases in which the 
government acts in its capacity as an employer.  Part II will then 
review the development of substantive due process jurisprudence in 
the privacy context over the last century and describe how Lawrence 
represents the fulfillment of an expansive view of these constitutional 
rights in the form of the interest in decisional non-interference in 
private affairs.  Based on this new constitutional development, Part III 
will propose a modified version of the Pickering test, which 
simultaneously discards the Connick public concern test and more 
appropriately, from the start, weighs public employees’ interests in 
decisional non-interference in private affairs against government 
employers’ efficiency concerns.  Finally, in an attempt to discern the 
analytical strengths and weaknesses of this new test, Part IV will apply 
the modified Pickering analysis to the John Roe case and some real 
world public employee cases and hypothetical scenarios. 
I. THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS IN PUBLIC 
EMPLOYMENT 
To begin to understand the inadequacy of the existing 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in public employment regarding 
public employees’ substantive due process rights post-Lawrence, it is 
first necessary to explore the legal boundaries of the current doctrine.  
The following three sections undertake a brief analysis of the historical 
foundations of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, analyze the 
Connick/Pickering line of public employee free speech cases, and 
finally highlight the peculiar lack of unconstitutional conditions in 
employment cases outside of the First Amendment. 
A. A Brief Introduction to the Historical Foundations of the Doctrine 
Historically, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions first 
enjoyed widespread use in the early part of the 20th century when the 
 
 22 See infra Part IV.B. 
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Lochner Court23 developed economic substantive due process.24  Under 
economic substantive due process, the Lochner Court emphasized 
property rights and the freedom to contract.25  During the zenith of 
this period, the Court held that states could not condition corporate 
privileges upon the forfeiture of economic substantive due process 
rights.26  This limitation on the government’s ability to use its various 
powers to limit individual’s constitutional rights was, in hindsight, the 
first incarnation of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 
With the “switch in time that saved nine”27 and the ascendancy of 
President Roosevelt’s New Deal Court in the late 1930s and early 
1940s, however, the Lochner era came to an abrupt halt.28  In the 
ensuing period, a new Supreme Court abolished much of the Lochner 
Court’s economic substantive due process jurisprudence and, as a 
 
 23 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (utilizing substantive due 
process analysis to strike down maximum hour laws for bakers because of its 
“arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty”), 
overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963), and Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423, 425 (1952). 
 24 The Lochner Court constitutionalized property rights and the liberty to contract 
under a theory of economic substantive due process as a means to strike down much 
social welfare legislation during the first part of the 20th century.  See, e.g., Adair v. 
United States, 208 U.S. 161, 171, 180  (1908) (invalidating federal law prohibiting 
interstate carriers from terminating workers for union membership), overruled in part 
by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941).  See generally Sujit 
Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1 
(2004) (providing comprehensive analysis of various meanings ascribed to Lochner 
Era). 
 25 See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561-62 (1923) (striking 
down minimum wage law for women); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) 
(striking down Kansas statute that prohibited employers from conditioning 
employment on employee’s agreement to refrain from joining labor organization); 
Adair, 208 U.S. at 171, 180 (invalidating federal law prohibiting interstate carriers 
from terminating workers for union membership). 
 26 Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of 
Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 n.7 (1988) (“[Unconstitutional conditions first] 
appear[] in Justice Bradley’s dissent in Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U.S. 535, 
543 (1876):  ‘Though a State may have the power, if it sees fit to subject its citizens to 
the inconvenience, of prohibiting all foreign corporations from transacting business 
within its jurisdiction, it has no power to impose unconstitutional conditions upon 
their doing so.’”). 
 27 See William H. Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 593-94 
(2004) (quoting FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL 
QUOTATIONS 393 (1933)). 
 28 Indeed, Lochner itself was eventually “implicitly rejected.”  Whalen v. Roe, 429 
U.S. 589, 597 (1977).  See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) 
(“We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of 
laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.”). 
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result, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions itself went through 
a substantial period of disuse.29  Shortly thereafter, however, the 
Warren Court of the 1950s and 1960s rescued the doctrine from the 
dustbin of legal history and began to apply it to a number of cases 
involving civil rights and civil liberties.30 
Many of the more recent unconstitutional conditions cases involve 
the government acting in its role as a sovereign,31 seeking to induce 
certain preferred outcomes through use of government subsidies and 
tax exemptions.32  In these “government subsidy” cases, the 
government seeks to utilize its Spending Clause power33 to award 
government largesse to individuals in return for their agreeing to 
significant burdens on their “preferred rights,” especially their First 
Amendment rights to speech, expression, and association.34 
So from whence does this rejuvenated version of the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions derive?  While not anchored in any single 
 
 29 See Kathleen A. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 
1416 (1989). 
 30 See id. 
 31 As will be discussed in detail below, government can act either in its sovereign 
or employer capacity.  See infra Part I.B.1. 
 32 But see Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548-49 (2001) 
(overturning regulation which would have conditioned government funding based on 
legal services attorneys agreeing not to challenge the validity of existing welfare laws 
for constitutional or statutory reasons); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 
U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (overturning § 399 of Corporation for Public Broadcasting Act, 
which conditioned public broadcasting subsidies based on non-commercial 
educational broadcasters agreeing not to editorialize); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 
513, 527-29 (1958) (overturning California law which sought to have all veterans 
seeking certain tax exemption sign declaration that they did not advocate overthrow 
of United States by force or violence or other unlawful means). 
 33 The Spending Clause of the United States Constitution states:  “The Congress 
shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the 
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States . 
. . .”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  Congress is allowed to provide incentives under its 
Spending Clause powers, but it may not coerce federal funding recipients through this 
power.  See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (“[Congress may not 
induce the recipient of federal funding] to engage in activities that would themselves 
be unconstitutional.”). 
 34 A considerable amount of dissonance exists between two different groups of 
Justices, and indeed there are two different schools of jurisprudential thought 
concerning the application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in these so-
called “government subsidy” cases.  See Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1415-16 (noting 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is “a minefield to be traversed gingerly” and 
“riven with inconsistencies”).  Fortunately, this debate does not arise in employment 
cases and, therefore, is beyond the scope of this article.  For an in-depth discussion of 
these cases, see generally Sullivan, supra note 29 and Berman, supra note 8. 
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clause of the Federal Constitution, the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions has been called a “creature of judicial implication.”35  In its 
simplest terms, the modern form of the doctrine prohibits the 
government from conditioning a governmental benefit based on an 
individual’s forfeiting a constitutional right under certain 
circumstances.36  Although what the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine holds is generally uncontested, specifying the “certain 
circumstances” under which the doctrine is thought to apply is a 
completely different story.37 
For instance, Dean Kathleen Sullivan attempts to limit the doctrine 
to incursions into “preferred rights.”38  Professor Mitchell Berman, for 
his part, believes that this is an unhelpful distinction because there is 
generally much disagreement over what should and should not be a 
preferred right.39  This paper follows Sullivan’s “conventional 
formulation” regarding the scope of the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine.  Indeed, a cursory survey of the different types of cases in 
which the doctrine has been applied over the years appears to track 
mostly instances involving arguably “preferred” rights.40  For instance, 
 
 35 See Epstein, supra note 26, at 10. 
 36 See Berman, supra note 8, at 3 (“[I]t is now universally recognized that 
[governmental] conditional offers are sometimes constitutionally permissible and 
sometimes not.  Indeed, correctly understood, that is all the famed and contentious 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds.”); see also Sullivan, supra note 29, at 
1421-22 (“Unconstitutional conditions problems arise when government offers a 
benefit on condition that the recipient perform or forego an activity that a preferred 
constitutional right normally protects from government interference.”). 
 37 See Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions:  The Problem of Negative Rights in a 
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (1984) (observing that unconstitutional 
conditions decisions “manifest[] an inconsistency so marked as to make a legal realist 
of almost any reader”). 
 38 See Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1421-22.  For Sullivan, “preferred constitutional 
rights” refer to rights normally protected by strict judicial review.  Id. at 1427. 
 39 See Berman, supra note 8, at 9-10 (“[U]nder Dean Sullivan’s formulation — the 
conventional formulation — the question of whether this liberty interest rises to a 
constitutional right (or, as she puts it, a ‘preferred’ constitutional right) determines 
not only whether the condition is unconstitutional, but whether the law even presents 
an unconstitutional conditions problem.  This is unfortunate, for whether a preferred 
right is involved may prove controversial or uncertain . . . .  ‘[P]referred rights’ . . . do 
not come to our attention predefined.”). 
 40 It is true that Sullivan limits her theory “normally” to rights which receive strict 
scrutiny.  See Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1427.  But there does not appear to be any 
sound reason to differentiate between different forms of heightened scrutiny in the 
unconstitutional conditions context.  This is not to say there are not meaningful 
distinctions between “mere liberty interests” protected by rational basis review and 
“constitutional rights” protected by some form of heightened scrutiny, or even 
perhaps between “non-preferred rights” that get some form of heightened review and 
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courts applied the doctrine to First Amendment cases involving tax 
exemptions,41 users of public facilities,42 recipients of government 
subsidies,43 and government employees,44 and to Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment cases involving property takings and just compensation.45 
All that being said, public employment is the legal context in which 
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is most often applied.  As 
Professor Jason Mazzone aptly points out, “[p]ublic employment . . . 
represents a constant opportunity for the government to persuade 
individuals to give up certain First Amendment protections in 
exchange for a regular paycheck.”46  It is thus to a more detailed 
discussion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in public 
employment that this paper now turns. 
B. Unconstitutional Conditions in Public Employment and the First 
Amendment 
As an initial matter, in unconstitutional conditions in employment 
cases, the government retains much more leeway in interfering with 
individual rights than it does when acting in the government subsidy 
context described in the previous section.47  As a result, individuals in 
these employment cases generally possess fewer speech and expression 
 
“preferred rights” which are due strict judicial review.  Rather, assuming one accepts 
that the constitutional right involved is due some form of heightened review, it is 
unimportant for the sake of the unconstitutional conditions analysis whether that 
right is subject to “rational review with bite,” intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny.  
See Paul M. Secunda, Lawrence’s Quintessential Millian Moment and Its Impact on the 
Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 50 VILL. L. REV. 117, 133-36 (2005).  That is, 
the relevant inquiry is whether the particular liberty interest is sufficiently important 
to the individual as to place on the government a demand for heightened justification 
before it interferes with that interest.  Accord Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[The liberty of the Due Process Clause] . . . recognizes, what 
a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly 
careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.”). 
 41 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958). 
 42 See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 384 
(1993); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 169 (1972). 
 43 See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 366 (1984). 
 44 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 
U.S. 138, 138 (1983). 
 45 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 825 (1987). 
 46 Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 810 (2003). 
 47 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1069 (2d 
ed. 2002). 
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protections under the First Amendment.48  To more fully understand 
why this state of affairs exists in the context, this section proceeds by 
first discussing the government’s unique status when it acts in an 
employer capacity.  This section next considers the Supreme Court’s 
traditional recognition of this unique status through the 
Connick/Pickering First Amendment analysis. 
1. The Unique Status of Government as Employer 
Although most jurists once believed that government benefits, 
including public employment, were mere privileges that could be 
withheld or limited on any condition,49 the Supreme Court now 
emphatically rejects “the greater includes the lesser” premise.50  In the 
landmark public employment case, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the 
Supreme Court stated:  “‘[T]he theory that public employment which 
may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, 
regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.’”51  In 
other words, the government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a 
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests — 
especially, his interest in freedom of speech.”52  This is because if the 
government could deny a benefit like public employment based on a 
person’s exercise of a constitutional right, there is little doubt that the 
exercise of that right would be inhibited; indeed, perhaps to the same  
 
 
 
 48 See Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions — A Research 
Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 635 (1999) (“Under free speech law, 
the government acting as employer has far more authority to restrict people’s speech 
than does the government acting as sovereign.”). 
 49 While a judge on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes once famously said that, in the employment context, a person “may have a 
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman.”  McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
 50 See Mazzone, supra note 46, at 806 (“The doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions rejects the notion that the government’s power to grant a benefit includes 
the lesser power to attach any conditions at all to receiving that benefit.”). 
 51 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 345 F.2d 
236, 239 (2d Cir. 1965)); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) 
(“For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person 
has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may 
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which 
the government may not rely.”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (“It is 
too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be 
infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.”). 
 52 See Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597. 
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extent as if the government directly commanded the person not to 
engage in that constitutionally protected conduct in the first place.53 
Yet even though the government employer does not possess 
unfettered discretion when it comes to impinging upon the exercise of 
its employees’ constitutional rights, it retains substantial latitude when 
setting the terms and conditions of its employees’ employment, a 
discretion which is not available in its dealing with the same 
individuals as citizens.54  In this regard, Justice Marshall famously 
stated in Pickering v. Board of Education:  “[I]t cannot be gainsaid that 
the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its 
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in 
connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.”55  
Although Justice Marshall in Pickering did not expressly support his 
assertion, the Supreme Court on numerous occasions since reaffirmed 
that government possesses significantly more authority over 
individuals when acting in its employment capacity.56 
 
 
 53 Id. (“For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his 
constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would 
in effect be penalized and inhibited . . . . [And it would] ‘produce a result which (it) 
could not command directly.’”) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 
(1958)). 
 54 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006) (concluding that 
public employee official capacity speech not protected by First Amendment in light of 
increased disciplinary needs of government employer); Bd. of County Comm’rs v. 
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (discussing disciplinary and efficiency needs of 
government employer as reason for broader discretion when government acts in this 
capacity); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1994) (plurality opinion) 
(explaining why government as employer has broader powers with regard to its citizen 
than when acting in its sovereign capacity). 
 55 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (emphasis added); see also 
Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 94 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The 
restrictions that the Constitution places upon the government in its capacity as 
lawmaker, i.e., as the regulator of private conduct, are not the same as the restrictions 
it places upon the government in its capacity as employer.”). 
 56 See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718 (1994) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“We have . . . no one Free Speech Clause test.  We have different tests 
for content-based speech restrictions, for content-neutral speech restrictions, for 
restrictions imposed by the government acting as employer, for restrictions in 
nonpublic fora, and so on.”); Waters, 511 U.S. at 671-72 (plurality opinion) (“We 
have never explicitly answered this question [about the government’s dual roles], 
though we have always assumed that its premise is correct — that the government as 
employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign.”) 
(citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983); Civil 
Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973). 
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For example, in Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr,57 Justice 
O’Connor explained that the government employer retains significant 
discretion in terminating or sanctioning an employee given its 
interests in running an efficient, efficacious, responsive, and non-
corrupt public service.58  Similarly, Justice Powell explained in his 
concurring opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy that the government in its role 
as an employer must be given a wide berth in administering internal 
personnel policies in order to be able to maintain an efficient and 
disciplined workplace.59  Finally, in Waters v. Churchill, Justice 
O’Connor further distinguished the two differing roles that 
government undertakes.  For instance, she explained that based on the 
government’s needs in its employer capacity, certain First Amendment 
doctrines are not reasonably applicable to government employees’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 57 518 U.S. 668 (1996). 
 58 Id. at 674 (“The government needs to be free to terminate both employees and 
contractors for poor performance, to improve the efficiency, efficacy, and 
responsiveness of service to the public, and to prevent the appearance of 
corruption.”); see also Waters, 511 U.S. at 674-75 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he extra 
power the government has [as employer] . . . comes from the nature of the 
government’s mission as employer.  Government agencies are charged by law with 
doing particular tasks.  Agencies hire employees to help do those tasks as effectively 
and efficiently as possible.  When someone who is paid a salary so that she will 
contribute to an agency’s effective operation begins to do or say things that detract 
from the agency’s effective operation, the government employer must have some 
power to restrain her.”); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional 
Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1250 (1999) (“The government has instrumental or 
programmatic goals within the domain of management.  When acting there, it may 
restrict individual autonomy in the service of its programmatic goals.”) (citing C. 
Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 
16-21 (1998)).  Indeed, absent contractual, statutory, or constitutional restriction, the 
government is entitled to terminate employees and contractors on an at-will basis, for 
good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.  See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674. 
 59 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (“[T]he Government’s 
interest . . . is the maintenance of employee efficiency and discipline. . . .  To this end, 
the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over the 
management of its personnel and internal affairs.”).  If it were otherwise, Justice 
Powell explains, the government employer would not be able to remove inefficient 
and unsatisfactory workers quickly, and the government’s substantial interest in so 
doing would be frustrated without adequate justification.  Id. 
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speech,60 and that less stringent procedural requirements appertain to 
restrictions on such employees’ speech.61 
Nevertheless, while it is generally agreed that the government holds 
more power to interfere with individuals’ constitutional rights in its 
employment capacity,62 it is difficult to determine the exact amount of 
disruption employee speech or conduct must cause before the 
government employer can intervene.63  The next section turns to this 
difficult question. 
2. The First Amendment Speech and Expression Rights of Public  
Employees:  The Connick/Pickering Analysis 
To determine whether the government employer is acting in a 
“reasonable” manner and consistent with other constitutional contexts 
involving “reasonableness” tests,64 the Supreme Court engages in a 
constitutional balancing act.65  Justice Marshall set forth the applicable 
balancing in Pickering:  “The problem in any case is to arrive at a 
balance between the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.”66  Important 
considerations in carrying out this balance include whether the 
employee’s statements will impair discipline by superiors, harmony 
 
 60 See Waters, 511 U.S. at 672 (reviewing number of First Amendment doctrines 
that do not apply with same force in government as employer context, including 
instances in which employer “may bar its employees from using Mr. Cohen’s offensive 
utterance to members of the public or to the people with whom they work”) (citing 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971)). 
 61 Id. at 673. 
 62 See, e.g., id. (observing that Court has “consistently given greater deference to 
government predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than to 
predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large”). 
 63 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983) (noting difficulty associated 
with Pickering balance). 
 64 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342-43 (1985) (balancing test 
utilized to show reasonableness in Fourth Amendment government search of public 
school student’s purse); see also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing in detail Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness test as applied to government employees). 
 65 See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 678 (1996). 
 66 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).  Moreover, this 
framework applies regardless of the public employee’s contractual or other claims to a 
job.  See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).  In this sense, First 
Amendment claims based on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions are distinct 
from procedural due process claims which depend on whether the public employee is 
thought to have a liberty or property interest in his or her employment.  See id. at 599. 
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among coworkers, close working relationships for which personal 
loyalty and confidence are necessary, the performance of the 
employee’s duties, or the enterprise’s regular operation.67 
In Pickering, the Court applied this constitutional framework for 
public employee First Amendment rights to a case involving a public 
school teacher terminated after criticizing in a local newspaper 
editorial a school district proposal to increase taxes, which the school 
board and superintendent endorsed.68  Based on these circumstances, 
the Court found that the balancing of interests came out in the 
teacher’s favor because the statement concerned a matter of public 
concern (i.e., whether the school system required additional funds) 
and there was no evidence that the statement disrupted the teacher’s 
relationship with coworkers, his own job duties, or the school’s 
operation in general.69  In such an instance, the Court found that “it is 
necessary to regard the [public school teacher] as the member of the 
general public he seeks to be.”70 
The 1983 case of Connick v. Myers, however, gave the Pickering 
balancing test an important, and ambiguous, gloss.71  Although the 
Court’s formulation in Pickering included the phrasing “a matter of 
public concern,”72 Connick elaborated upon what counts as “a matter 
of public concern.”73  In Connick, an assistant district attorney 
circulated to coworkers a questionnaire concerning internal office 
affairs in order to discover whether a general job satisfaction problem 
existed in the New Orleans District Attorney’s office.74  Emphasizing 
“the common sense realization that government offices could not 
function if every employment decision became a constitutional 
matter,”75 the Court ruled that even before a Pickering balance could 
 
 67 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 
570-73). 
 68 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564. 
 69 Id. at 571-73.  The Court also noted the import of allowing public employees to 
speak out on matters of public concern because they are many times in the best 
position to have “informed and definite opinions.”  See id. at 572. 
 70 See id. at 574.  Of course, regarding the public employee “as the member of the 
general public he seeks to be” does not mean that government employees qualify for 
the more stringent protections that apply to citizens when the government acts in its 
sovereign capacity.  See supra Part I.B.1. 
 71 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983). 
 72 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 73 See Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion:  The Struggle to Define Speech on 
Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 47-50 (1988). 
 74 Connick, 461 U.S. at 140-41. 
 75 Id. at 143. 
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occur, a court had to consider as a threshold matter whether the 
public employee was speaking on a “matter of public concern.”76  In 
other words, the Court made the public concern test the center of this 
crucial inquiry based on its belief that all previous unconstitutional 
conditions in employment cases centered on “the rights of public 
employees to participate in public affairs.”77  Because the Court 
concluded that most of the questionnaire circulated by Myers 
concerned matters of private interest, rather than of public concern,78 
it dismissed most of the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim at this 
threshold level.79 
While Connick explained the centrality of the public concern test to 
the public employee free speech analysis, it provided little guidance as 
to how to draw the lines between what is “a matter of public concern” 
and what is a “matter of private interest.”80  All that Connick stated in 
this regard was that “[w]hether an employee’s speech addresses a 
 
 76 Id. at 146 (“Pickering, its antecedents and progeny, lead us to conclude that if 
[the] questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter 
of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her 
discharge.”). 
 77 Id. at 144-45.  Justice White explained for the majority that “[w]hen employee 
expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or 
other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in 
managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the 
First Amendment.”  Id. at 146. 
 78 Id. at 154.  The Court went out of its way to emphasize that public employee 
speech on private matters does not constitute unprotected speech such as obscenity or 
fighting words.  See id. at 147.  Nevertheless, “when a public employee speaks not as a 
citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only 
of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the 
appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a 
public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.”  Id. 
 79 Id. at 154.  As for the one question on the questionnaire that could be 
characterized as a matter of public concern, the Court found that because of the 
disruptive effect of this question on the workplace, the Pickering balance came out in 
favor of the government.  Id.  As Randy Kozel has aptly commented, this disruption 
theory of public employee speech is unsettling because “[s]uch a test is inconsistent 
with the notion of robust exchange of divergent ideas, as it leaves vulnerable the 
speech that is most likely to have a strong effect.”  See Randy J. Kozel, 
Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1018 (2005). 
 80 One issue that has been decided about the public concern test since Connick, 
however, is that a statement made by a public employee in a private conversation 
criticizing a political official may still be considered speech on a matter of “public” 
concern.  See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386-87 (1987); see also Givhan v. 
W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979) (holding that public 
employee may express her views in private to employer and still be protected by First 
Amendment). 
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matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, 
and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”81  
Consequently, Connick leaves much to be desired and demands further 
clarification.82 
Nevertheless, the substantial legal hurdles Connick imposed on 
public employees become much more manageable in one subset of 
cases and irrelevant in another.  The first subset of cases involve 
instances in which the employee speech is completely unrelated to his 
or her public employment and is spoken on the employee’s own time, 
but still qualifies as a matter of public concern.83  This type of case is 
exemplified by United States v. National Treasury Employees Union 
(“NTEU”),84 in which the federal government passed a law prohibiting 
federal employees from receiving honoraria for making speeches or 
writing articles.85  Significantly, the prohibition applied even though 
the subject of the article did not have any connection to the 
government employee’s employment.86 
 
 81 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. 
 82 It is therefore not surprising that a veritable cottage industry of academic 
literature has attempted to make sense of this amorphous, unsatisfying test.  See, e.g., 
Allred, supra note 73, at 75-81 (describing conflict and confusion surrounding public 
concern test and proposing alternative standard); Kozel, supra note 79, at 1044-51 
(putting forth internal/external model of public employee speech to replace current 
Connick/Pickering approach); Paul Cerkvenik, Note, Who Your Friends Are Could Get 
You Fired!  The Connick “Public Concern” Test Unjustifiably Restricts Public Employees’ 
Associational Rights, 79 MINN. L. REV. 425, 445 (1994) (discussing confusion 
surrounding whether public concern test applies to public employee freedom of 
association cases); Karin B. Hoppmann, Note, Concern with Public Concern:  Toward a 
Better Definition of the Pickering/Connick Threshold Test, 50 VAND. L. REV. 993, 996 
(1997) (stating that Connick Court failed to supply clear definition of public concern 
and that test is flawed); Kermit Roosevelt, Note, The Costs of Agencies:  Waters v. 
Churchill and the First Amendment in the Administrative State, 106 YALE L.J. 1233, 1241 
(1997) (criticizing vagueness of public concern test); D. Gordon Smith, Comment, 
Beyond “Public Concern”:  New Free Speech Standards for Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 249, 255-64 (1990) (contending that problems surrounding public concern 
test have led to undue restriction on public employees’ free speech rights). 
 83 Indeed, as early as Connick, the Court recognized that different factors might be 
at play when the public employee speech involves off-duty, non-work related 
activities.  See Connick, 461 U.S. at 153 n.13 (citing NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 
322 (1974)). 
 84 513 U.S. 454 (1995). 
 85 Id. at 457, 459. 
 86 Id.  Examples of the plaintiffs’ speeches in this case include a mail handler who 
wanted to give lectures on the Quaker religion, an aerospace engineer who lectured on 
black history, and a microbiologist who wrote articles on dance performances.  See id. 
at 461-62.  Importantly, the Court noted that these federal employees sought 
compensation for their expressive activities in their capacity as citizens, not as 
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Finding that the federal employees’ expressive activities fell within 
the category of comment on matters of public concern,87 the Court 
easily concluded under Pickering that the employees’ interests 
outweighed those of the government.88  More interestingly, the Court 
appears to be saying that even when speech is completely unrelated to 
a public employee’s job, the public concern test is still the appropriate 
test to apply.89  In other words, even when a public employee is acting 
in her capacity as a citizen, under the First Amendment analysis, that 
employee is still treated as a government employee if the speech 
restriction is predicated upon the individual’s public employment.90 
 
government employees, and these activities did not have any adverse impact on the 
efficiency of the offices in which they worked.  Id. at 465 (“Neither the character of 
the authors, the subject matter of their expression, the effect of the content of their 
expression on their official duties, nor the kind of audiences they address has any 
relevance to their employment.”). 
 87 See id. at 466 (“Respondents’ expressive activities in this case fall within the 
protected category of citizen comment on matters of public concern rather than 
employee comment on matters related to personal status in the workplace.  The 
speeches and articles for which they received compensation in the past were addressed 
to a public audience, were made outside the workplace, and involved content largely 
unrelated to their government employment.”).  Interestingly, the dichotomy 
seemingly set up by the Court in NTEU does not contemplate whether a government 
employer can fire an employee for engaging in conduct outside of work not addressed 
to a public audience and not on matters of public concern, such as the situation where 
a public employee is fired for writing poetry on her own time.  A literal reading of 
Connick and NTEU would suggest that the poetry-writing employee would have no 
constitutional protection, a seemingly absurd result.  Such an employee might be 
protected, however, under the proposed modified Pickering test for post-Lawrence 
substantive due process rights.  See infra Parts IV.B, V.B.  The author particularly 
wishes to thank Professor Mitch Berman for his insights on the issues discussed in this 
footnote. 
 88 Furthermore, when Congress seeks to deter in a wholesale fashion a broad 
category of expression, the burden on the government will be especially heavy.  See 
NTEU, 513 U.S. at 467; see also id. at 468 (“The widespread impact of the honoraria 
ban . . . gives rise to far more serious concerns than could any single supervisory 
decision.”).  The Court also found that a prohibition on compensation for speech, 
rather than on the speech itself, could cause just as much of a burden on an 
employee’s expressive activity.  See id. at 468. 
 89 Accord Kozel, supra note 79, at 1051 (observing that when employee speech in 
question includes “indicia of the speaker’s employment, the proper analytical rubric 
[is] the familiar Connick/Pickering two-step”); see also NTEU, 513 U.S. at 480 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The time-tested Pickering balance . . . provides the 
governing framework for analysis of all manner of restrictions on speech by the 
government as employer.”). 
 90 A possible alternative view would have permitted the employee, when speaking 
as a citizen, to take advantage of the more stringent protections of the traditional First 
Amendment analysis.  See Connick, 461 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“When 
public employees engage in expression unrelated to their employment while away 
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In addition to this category of easily manageable public concern 
cases represented by NTEU, the Supreme Court much more recently 
determined that there is a second, perhaps even larger, subset of 
public employee speech cases where one does not even need to 
grapple with Connick’s public concern test.  In Garcetti v. Ceballos,91 
the Court discussed what constitutional protections, if any, are due to 
a public employee when that employee speaks out publicly on matters 
which are part of his job description.92  In Ceballos, a deputy district 
attorney for Los Angeles County claimed that his public employer 
retaliated against him by assigning him to less desirable work as a 
result of his writing a memo criticizing the issuing of a warrant in a 
criminal case.93 
The Court found that since the deputy district attorney was not 
speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, but rather as an 
employee of the government, Connick’s public concern test and the 
constitutional balancing of interests under Pickering did not even need 
to be reached.94  In this vein, writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy 
found that were it otherwise, state and federal courts would be 
constantly intruding into the realm of communications between and 
among government employees and their superiors.95  Consequently, 
“official capacity speech” after Ceballos is another category of public 
employee free speech that is not subject to the vagaries of the Connick 
public concern test.  Unlike the cases represented by NTEU, however, 
this subset of cases has the effect of lessening the First Amendment 
protections for public employees. 
The fact that public employee free speech rights have taken such a 
substantial blow as a result of the Ceballos decision makes it all the 
more important to identify other public employee constitutional rights 
recognized by the Court in the past.  But as the next section illustrates, 
the Court has been reluctant, without apparent sufficient reason, to  
 
 
from the work place, their First Amendment rights are, of course, no different from 
those of the general public.”). 
 91 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). 
 92 Id. at 1955 (“The question presented by the instant case is whether the First 
Amendment protects a government employee from discipline based on speech made 
pursuant to the employee’s official duties.”). 
 93 Id. at 1955-56. 
 94 Id. at 1960 (“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to 
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from 
employer discipline.”). 
 95 Id. at 1961. 
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apply the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in employment 
outside the First Amendment context. 
C. The Peculiar Lack of Unconstitutional Conditions in Employment 
Cases Outside of the First Amendment 
As can be gathered from the intricate legal analysis described in the 
previous section, the Supreme Court continues to spend a substantial 
amount of time working out the contours of the First Amendment 
speech rights of public employees.  The same cannot be said of the 
parameters of public employees’ constitutional rights outside of the 
First Amendment.  Although such cases do exist (most at the lower 
federal court level with one exception),96 the Court applies mostly the 
government-as-employer analysis in the First Amendment context.97 
Of the few cases that do exist, some are highlighted by Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, a political 
affiliation case.98  For instance, in the Fourth Amendment context, 
Justice Scalia noted that private citizens are not subjected to 
governmental searches and seizures of their property without a 
warrant supported by probable cause.  In contrast, in many 
 
 96 See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245 (1976) (upholding hair length 
regulations for police officers under substantive due process, noting, “If such state 
regulations may survive challenges based on the explicit language of the First 
Amendment, there is surely even more room for restrictive regulations of state 
employees where the claim implicates only the more general contours of the 
substantive liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  Many more of 
these cases have percolated through the lower federal courts throughout the years, 
without much success for public employee plaintiffs.  See, e.g., Akers v. McGinnis, 352 
F.3d 1030, 1040-41 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that anti-fraternization rule not allowing 
prison employees to associate with offenders off-duty did not violate employee’s 
freedom of intimate association); Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1110 (11th Cir. 
1997) (rehearing en banc) (upholding discharge of staff attorney of Georgia 
Department of Law who was fired when employer learned of planned homosexual 
marriage ceremony); Rathert v. Vill. of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510, 515-16 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(finding that prohibiting police officers from wearing earrings off-duty rationally 
related to permissible purpose); see also Steve Hartsoe, ACLU Challenges N.C. 
Cohabitation Law, WASH. POST, May 10, 2005, at A06 (describing ACLU lawsuit filed 
against Pender County, North Carolina for forcing sheriff dispatcher to quit her job 
for violating state’s “adultery and fornication” law). 
 97 See Mazzone, supra note 46, at 810 (noting that “[t]he doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions has been most vigorously applied in First Amendment 
cases”). 
 98 See 497 U.S. 62, 94 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 
U.S. 238, 247 (1976) (upholding hair grooming regulation for police under 
substantive due process after finding clear, rational connection between regulation 
and promotion of safety of persons and property)). 
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circumstances government employees may have their property 
searched without violating the Fourth Amendment.99  Additionally, 
governmental entities may more easily conduct drug testing of public 
employees who are engaged in safety sensitive or confidential 
positions.100  This is because “in certain limited circumstances, the 
Government’s need to discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to 
prevent their development, is sufficiently compelling to justify the 
intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such searches without any 
measure of individualized suspicion.”101 
Scalia also notes in his Rutan dissent that in the Fifth Amendment 
context the government cannot force private citizens to provide 
information that incriminates them.  Government employees, 
however, can be dismissed from employment when the incriminating 
information in question is related to their job performance.102  Finally, 
in the substantive due process area pre-Lawrence, public employers 
historically could regulate such things as their police officers’ 
grooming practices.103  Consequently, pre-Lawrence and outside of the 
First Amendment, there was little protection for the constitutional 
rights for public employees.104  Indeed, even looking beyond Supreme 
Court cases to lower court decisions, there appears to be little  
 
 
 
 99 See id. (citing plurality opinion in O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 
(1987)). 
 100 See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 664 
(1989) (permitting drug testing of federal custom agents who interdict drugs or carry 
weapons); Knox County Educ. Ass’n. v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 384 
(6th Cir. 1998) (upholding policy of suspicionless drug testing for all individuals who 
apply for, transfer to, or are promoted to “safety sensitive” positions within school 
system, including teaching positions). 
 101 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668. 
 102 See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 94-95 (citing Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 277-78 
(1968)). 
 103 See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976). 
 104 Although Kelley v. Johnson did involve the application of substantive due 
process to an unconstitutional condition in public employment case, it only applied a 
pre-Lawrence, traditional rational basis review analysis.  See Kelley, 425 U.S. at 247-48.  
In fact, the Supreme Court failed to grant certiorari in two cases concerning the right 
to decisional non-interference in private affairs in the early 1980s.   See Rowland v. 
Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1011 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (describing case upholding firing of public high school teacher 
who was terminated for mere fact of being bisexual); Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 
U.S. 965, 965 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (discussing 
case upholding firing of male police sergeant and female patrol office for engaging in 
romantic relationship together). 
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protection for non-First Amendment rights, like substantive due 
process rights.105 
The lack of unconstitutional conditions in employment cases 
outside of the First Amendment is puzzling.  There does not seem to 
be any good analytical reason why this is so, except for the most 
obvious reason that this is the context where most public employee 
cases arise.  Perhaps, however, this current state of affairs will become 
an anachronism with the additional emphasis being placed on 
interests in employee decisional autonomy in light of Lawrence v. 
Texas.106 
Consistent with this line of thought, the next section argues that 
recent developments in substantive due process law, ushered in by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence, should lead to a reinvigoration 
of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in employment outside 
of the First Amendment in cases involving public employees’ interests 
in decisional non-interference in private affairs.  Before discussing the 
fundamental changes brought about by Lawrence, however, it is first 
necessary to place Lawrence in historical context.  This chronological 
approach will provide further insight into how Lawrence represents 
the adoption of a particular view of the liberty interest contained 
within the federal Constitution’s due process clause.  It is to that task 
that this paper now turns. 
II. LAWRENCE AND THE RIGHT TO DECISIONAL NON-INTERFERENCE IN 
PRIVATE AFFAIRS 
A. The Various Incomplete Incarnations of the Right to Decisional Non-
Interference Prior to Lawrence v. Texas 
Since Brandeis and Warren wrote their famous article in 1890 about 
privacy rights,107 the only thing that commentators seem to agree on 
concerning the right to privacy is that there is very little agreement 
about its contours.108  It is not my goal here to suggest a theory or 
taxonomy of privacy.109  Rather, this section discusses an individual’s 
 
 105 See supra discussion accompanying note 97. 
 106 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 107 See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 108 See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1099-1124 
(2002) (cataloging different conceptions of privacy that various courts and 
commentators have championed). 
 109 For a recent attempt at a pragmatic theory of privacy, see, for example, id. at 
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interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs, and the 
various labels and methods which courts have utilized to protect these 
decisional autonomy interests prior to Lawrence.110  Specifically, this 
section categorizes the various approaches to decisional non-
interference as part of the jurisprudences of:  (1) the right to be let 
alone; (2) the right to personhood; and (3) the right to intimacy or 
intimate association. 
1. The Right to Be Let Alone 
The place to start this discussion, as always, must be with the 
seminal Brandeis and Warren article.111  Prior to this time, the Court 
only recognized constitutional privacy rights stemming directly from 
concrete and explicit constitutional provisions addressing privacy 
concerns in particular contexts, and then only rarely.112  Brandeis and 
Warren talked of privacy generally as “a right to be let alone” by the 
government.113  To them, and to us today no less, a sphere of personal 
autonomy or “personality” exists upon which the government should 
 
1090-91 (developing theory of privacy based on Wittgenstein’s notion of “family 
resemblance”). 
 110 Here, I rely upon Solove’s taxonomy for privacy for the different types of 
decisional non-interference.  See id. at 1092; see also Solove, supra note 14, at 557 
(offering that under this more recent contextual taxonomy, violation of these types of 
“privacy rights” would be referred to as “decisional interference in private affairs”).  
Each of these categories, however, is not mutually exclusive and relies upon one 
another to varying degree under different conceptions of privacy.  See Solove, supra 
note 108, at 1116. 
 111 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 107, at 193. 
 
112
 Such individual constitutional provisions recognized prior to 1890 included the 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth 
Amendment, and the right not to be forced to incriminate oneself under the Fifth 
Amendment.  See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886) (“For the 
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost 
always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, 
which in criminal cases is condemned in the [F]ifth [A]mendment; and compelling a 
man ‘in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,’ which is condemned in the 
[F]ifth [A]mendment, throws light on the question as to what is an ‘unreasonable 
search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”) 
 113 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 107, at 193.  The Supreme Court utilized 
this definition of privacy a number of times shortly after the article was published.  
See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (concerning right to bodily 
integrity with regard to compulsory vaccination law); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (stating that person had right to be let alone where issue was 
whether plaintiff could be forced to undergo surgical examination).  Even so, the 
references to a “right to be let alone” in Supreme Court jurisprudence were relatively 
rare until after World War II. 
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not be able to tread arbitrarily.114  Of course, this very idea of the 
unencumbered individual sprang directly from more generic forms of 
classical liberalism.115  In turn, classical liberalism finds its root in 
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty116 and its most vivid expression in Justice 
Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead v. United States: 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure 
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.  They 
recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his 
feelings and of his intellect.  They knew that only a part of the 
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in 
material things.  They sought to protect Americans in their 
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.  
They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let 
alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men.117 
All that being said, the right to be let alone did not gain substantial 
traction in constitutional thought until after World War II.118  Indeed, 
earlier cases had been generally abysmal with regard to individual 
autonomy and dignity, as is no better demonstrated than by Justice 
Holmes’s infamous 1927 opinion in Buck v. Bell regarding the 
necessary sterilization of “imbeciles.”119 
 
 114 See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1052 (contending that American life is animated 
by presumptive libertarian mentality:  “Libertarian is the presumption that the state 
leaves us alone to choose our own path to happiness”); Warren & Brandeis, supra 
note 107, at 205-06 (noting that privacy was based on principle “of inviolate 
personality” and that there is “a general right to privacy for thoughts, emotions, and 
sensations”); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (holding that 
individuals have “fundamental . . . right to be free, except in very limited 
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy”). 
 115 By classical liberalism, I simply mean a political philosophy that endorses a 
conception of liberty as the absence of interference.  See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of 
Liberty, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 15, 16 (Michael Sandel ed., 1984). 
 116 See Secunda, supra note 40, at 118, 118 n.2 (discussing John Stuart Mill’s On 
Liberty). 
 117 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 118 As one indicia of its increasing presence, the “right to be let alone” language 
was utilized only three times prior to 1946, but 42 times since according to a recent 
Westlaw query.  See online search, www.westlaw.com, Supreme Court database 
(SCT), “da (before 1946) & ‘right to be let alone’” (Oct. 6, 2006); online search, 
www.westlaw.com, Supreme Court database (SCT), “da (after 1945) & ‘right to be let 
alone’” (Oct. 6, 2006). 
 119 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding compulsory sterilization legislation as 
constitutional and stating that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough”). 
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Despite some fits and starts, the crucial break in the constitutional 
levee came in the 1965 landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut.120  In 
Griswold, the Court located a constitutional right to privacy within the 
penumbras of the Bill of Rights.121  Suffice it to say that this case’s 
recognition of constitutionally recognized zones of privacy, unhinged 
from any one constitutional anchor, dramatically changed the Court’s 
orientation concerning individual rights to be free from arbitrary 
government interference.122  Although Griswold itself only struck 
down anti-contraception laws for married couples,123 its greater import 
derived from its rooting the right to be let alone within the very 
structure and fiber of the Federal Constitution.124 
Consequently, it could not be considered surprising when, 
thereafter, the right recognized in Griswold was extended to some 
non-married individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird125 and to additional 
individuals under the age of sixteen in Carey v. Population Services 
International.126  And not only was this zone of privacy found to exist 
in the sacred quarters of the marital bedroom,127 it was also decisively 
extended to more transcendental spheres with the recognition of a 
woman’s right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy in Roe v. 
 
 120 381 U.S. 479, 479 (1965). 
 121 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (“The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees 
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees 
that help give them life and substance.”); see also id. at 486, 488 (Goldberg, J., 
concurring) (locating right to privacy in Ninth Amendment’s reservation of certain 
fundamental rights to people); id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding privacy right 
as “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 
319, 325 (1937)).  But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605-06 (2003) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (maintaining no general right to privacy in Constitution). 
 122 See Robert Misner, Minimalism, Desuetude, and Fornication, 35 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 1, 25-26 (1999) (discussing impact of Griswold decision on constitutional 
privacy law). 
 123 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. 
 124 Id. at 485 (“The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the 
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”). 
 125 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972). 
 126 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977). 
 127 For a discussion of the importance of the conception of the home to historical 
constitutional privacy jurisprudence pre-Lawrence, see discussion infra note 170 and 
accompanying text.  See also Marc Stein, Boutilier and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Sexual 
Revolution, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 491, 535 (2005) (maintaining that based on its 
rulings from 1965 to 1973, “the [United States Supreme] Court’s vision of sexual 
citizenship was not libertarian or egalitarian . . . [but] was based on a doctrine that 
privileged adult, heterosexual, monogamous, marital, familial, domestic, private, and 
procreative forms of sexual expression.”). 
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Wade.128  Indeed, Roe decisively located these rights within the liberty 
interest contained in the substantive component of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.129  In this sense, Roe 
v. Wade signaled the culmination of a vision of privacy as a right to be 
let alone (now phrased as the “right to choose”) first discussed in 
Brandeis and Warren’s Harvard Law Review piece from 1890. 
2. The Right to Personhood:  Individuality, Dignity, and 
Autonomy 
The Court has not only sought to describe an individual’s right to be 
free from arbitrary government interference by merely relying upon 
Justice Brandeis’s vivid language in Olmstead concerning the “right to 
be let alone.”  It has also done so in those substantive due process 
cases which see the essence of the privacy right revolving around 
personhood, or more specifically, as involving themes of individuality, 
dignity, and autonomy.130  As Professor Solove explains, basing privacy 
on conceptions of personhood differs from other conceptions of 
privacy because personhood conceptions focus on the normative good 
“of the protection of the integrity of the personality.”131 
Griswold, Eisenstadt, Carey, and Roe all have at their core this 
conception of privacy as well.132  More importantly for purposes of this 
 
 128 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (“[A] right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of 
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.”). 
 129 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.  In line with locating these rights within the 
substantive component of the Due Process Clause, Justice Harlan famously wrote in 
another case: 
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot 
be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees 
elsewhere provided in the Constitution.  This “liberty” is not a series of 
isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of 
speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom 
from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on.  It is a rational 
continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial 
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints . . . and which also 
recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain 
interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to 
justify their abridgment. 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 130 See Solove, supra note 108, at 1116-19. 
 131 Id. at 1116. 
 132 Id. at 1117 (“[T]hese cases involved decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing.”).  Indeed, this line of 
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paper and its focus on decisional autonomy, however, is the case of 
Whalen v. Roe.  In Whalen, the Court tied this conception of privacy as 
personhood to an individual’s right to be free from arbitrary 
governmental interference with regard to an individual’s freedom in 
making certain fundamental life decisions.133 
More recently, this idea of privacy found its most “elegant 
encapsulation”134 in Justices O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy’s joint 
opinion in the pivotal 1992 case Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey.135  In the now famous “sweet-mystery-of-life” 
passage, derided by Justice Scalia and other commentators,136 these 
three Justices found that: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal 
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  At the heart of 
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.137 
 
 
substantive due process cases pre-dates even the Olmstead dissent.  See, e.g., Pierce v. 
Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding 
interest of parents in being able to send their children to private school to inhere 
within substantive due process); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding 
that Constitution’s protection of liberty encompasses interest of parents in having 
their children learn German). 
 133 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600; see also Solove, supra note 108, at 
1117 (“[T]he Court has conceptualized the protection of privacy as the state’s non-
interference in certain decisions that are essential in defining personhood.”). 
 134 See Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 
621, 655-56 (2005) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 
(1992)). 
 135 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 136 For examples of Justice Scalia’s and other commentators’ distaste of this 
phrasing, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Dwight G. Duncan, The Federal Marriage Amendment and Rule by Judges, 27 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 543, 558-59 (2004); James E. Fleming, Lawrence’s Republic, 39 TULSA L. 
REV. 563, 574-75 (2004).  See also Toone, supra note 134, at 655-56 (remarking that 
Justice Scalia’s derision notwithstanding, many have found “right to define one’s own 
concept of existence” formulation to be valuable). 
 137 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter) (emphasis added).  It is significant to note that the Casey joint opinion did not 
receive majority support in placing this type of all-encompassing liberty squarely 
within the substantive component of the Due Process Clauses.  Indeed, this 
conception based on individual autonomy and dignity remained a minority view of 
the Court until Lawrence.  See Secunda, supra note 40, at 135 n.84. 
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Nevertheless, prior to Lawrence, the scope of the personhood rights 
recognized by the joint opinion in Casey appeared to be largely limited 
by the “history and tradition” test of Washington v. Glucksberg, a case 
dealing with the right to physician-assisted suicide.138  There, the 
Court appeared to draw back from the broad conception of individual 
liberty from governmental interference set forth by the Casey plurality.  
In Glucksberg, the Court found that the State of Washington’s ban on 
assisted suicide did not violate individuals’ due process rights because 
such laws were rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose.139  In denying that such laws interfered with the fundamental 
rights of individuals, the Court employed a substantive due process 
analysis which considered whether there was a careful description of 
an asserted right that was one of “those fundamental rights and 
liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in the Nation’s history 
and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that 
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”140  
Finding that our nation’s history did not enshrine such a right to 
physician-assisted suicide, the Court found there was no fundamental 
right to assisted suicide under due process and upheld the Washington 
ban of physician-assisted suicide under rational basis review.141  
Consequently, as late as 1997, far from embracing the comprehensive 
notion of individual liberty to be free from governmental interference 
in making important life decisions embodied by Whalen and the joint 
opinion in Casey, the Supreme Court in Glucksberg appeared to be in 
the process of substantially narrowing the scope of its substantive due 
process jurisprudence.142  Similarly, in the realm of intimate 
association rights, and as described in the next subsection, an 
analogous limiting of the right to decisional non-interference in 
private affairs was also underway. 
 
 
 138 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 139 Id. at 735. 
 140 Id. at 720-21 (internal citations omitted). 
 141 Id. at 728.  As I have argued in a previous article, this stultifying view of the 
contours of substantive due process has been criticized by Supreme Court Justices and 
commentators as inconsistent with a broader and more appropriate view of freedom 
from governmental interference.  See Secunda, supra note 40, at 129 n.52. 
 142 Accord Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process Right to In Vitro 
Fertilization, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2792, 2798 (2005) (“Glucksberg’s ‘careful description’ 
test reflected the Court’s tendency, evinced in prior cases, toward narrow definition of 
the right in question as a means of checking the expansion of the Court’s substantive 
due process jurisprudence.”). 
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3. The Right to Intimacy and Intimate Association 
Closely connected to the right of personhood is the right to intimacy 
or intimate association.  The plurality in Casey’s “sweet-mystery-of-
life” passage utilized the word “intimate” to help define the 
constitutional interests at stake.143  Further, almost a decade earlier in 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees,144 the Court recognized an important 
distinction between First Amendment rights of expressive 
association145 and rights of intimate association under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.146  The latter rights recognize “that, 
because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it 
must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly 
personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from 
unjustified interference by the State.”147  The Roberts Court defined a 
central aspect of an individual’s freedom from decisional non-
interference in private, intimate association as the ability to form and 
maintain human bonds unmolested by the State.  The Court 
concluded that, “[p]rotecting these [intimate] relationships from 
unwarranted state interference . . . safeguards the ability 
independently to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of 
liberty.”148 
Despite Roberts’s seemingly strong endorsement of a right to 
intimate association and the concomitant freedom from unwarranted 
state interference, prior to Lawrence at least one significant Supreme 
Court case, Bowers v. Hardwick,149 discounted the importance of such 
human relationships.  Bowers held, of course, that there is no 
 
 143 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (joint 
opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter). 
 144 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 145 See generally Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural:  Expressive 
Associations and the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483 (2001) (discussing in 
comprehensive detail right to expressive association under First Amendment). 
 146 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18. 
 147 See id. at 618 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) and 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)); id. at 619 (“Moreover, the 
constitutional shelter afforded such relationships reflects the realization that 
individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.”).  
The citation to these older cases clearly places the freedom of intimate association 
within substantive due process jurisprudence, rather than the First Amendment. 
 148 Id. at 619.  Indeed, as Solove has explained, the important distinction between 
the liberty of personhood versus the liberty of intimacy is the difference between self-
creation and autonomy on the one hand, and the importance of human relationships 
to all individuals on the other.  See Solove, supra note 108, at 1121. 
 149 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy.150  Through 
Justice White’s narrow conception of the individual interest involved 
in Bowers as pure sexual gratification through the act of anal or oral 
intercourse in a homosexual relationship, the Court limited the scope 
of the liberty interest found in the Due Process Clause.151  That is, the 
Court failed to recognize that meaningful personal relationships are 
necessarily made up of both sexual and non-sexual dimensions, all for 
the larger individual pursuit of happiness.152 
Consequently, prior to June 2003, no comprehensive conception of 
decisional autonomy in private affairs existed which recognized an 
individual’s right to self-definition, as well as his or her right to engage 
in the process of self-definition through development of personal 
relationships with others.  To the extent that such a right to decisional 
non-interference in private affairs was recognized, as it was in the 
1977 case of Whalen v. Roe,153 it did not seem to be afforded any type 
of heightened protection from governmental incursions.  Finally, 
although past Supreme Court decisions recognized this type of liberty 
interest to some degree, the Court continued to struggle to define the 
more esoteric and non-material aspects of these liberty interests.  In 
sum, the existing contours of the jurisprudential privacy terrain when 
the Court decided Lawrence in June 2003 in no way predicted the 
seismic shift in this area of privacy law that Lawrence wrought. 
B. Lawrence v. Texas and the Fulfillment of Olmstead’s Legacy 
Lawrence,154 a criminal case from the state of Texas involving the 
application of that state’s sodomy statute to the private sexual 
activities of two consenting adult homosexuals, changed everything.  
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Lawrence greatly altered the 
substantive due process constitutional landscape by striking down the 
Texas anti-sodomy statute and reemphasizing the importance of 
providing a haven from state interference to individuals when such 
individuals seek to make private and personal decisions pertaining to 
 
 150 Id. at 190-91. 
 151 See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1032 (denominating Justice White’s opinion for 
Court as “brusque” and “limit[ing] the Court’s previous privacy precedents to 
situations unique to heterosexual couples (marriage, procreation, family)”). 
 152 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions 
favorable to the pursuit of happiness.  They recognized the significance of man’s 
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.”). 
 153 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977). 
 154 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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sex.  Importantly, Lawrence expands notions of the individual right to 
decisional non-interference in private affairs just when cases such as 
Bowers and Glucksberg were substantially limiting such notions. 
Lawrence’s central holding is that the Texas sodomy statute at issue 
furthered no legitimate state interest which could justify its intrusion 
into the personal and private lives of the homosexual individuals 
criminally sanctioned under that law.155  The decision is the first time 
a majority of the Supreme Court unabashedly accepted in one case a 
conception of privacy that included an individual’s rights to be let 
alone, to personhood, and to intimacy.156  In particular, by expressly 
overruling Bowers157 and, to a lesser extent, by failing to even mention 
Glucksberg as binding precedent,158 the Supreme Court put forward a 
novel type of substantive due process analysis.159  Even though 
Lawrence clearly relied on Griswold, Roe, and Casey in coming to its 
conclusion,160 the key additional step taken by Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion is to recognize a transcendental, non-material aspect to these 
types of liberty interests, consistent with the Olmstead and Poe dissents 
of bygone days.161 
 
 
 155 Id. at 578.  See also Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1056 (reading underlying 
message of Lawrence and Romer as:  “The state cannot create a pariah class of useful, 
productive citizens and deny them a broad range of legal rights and protections simply 
because their presumed private activities are disgusting to other citizens”). 
 156 Although a similar conception of decisional autonomy in private affairs was 
considered in Casey, it was not adopted by a majority of the court.  See supra note 137 
and accompanying text. 
 157 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 158 See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas:  The Fundamental Right That Dare 
Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (maintaining that “the 
[Lawrence] Court gave short shrift to the notion that it was under some obligation to 
confine its implementation of substantive due process to the largely mechanical 
exercise of isolating ‘fundamental rights’ as though they were a historically given set of 
data points on a two-dimensional grid”). 
 159 Accord Robert C. Post, Foreword:  Fashioning the Legal Constitution:  Culture, 
Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 97 (2003) (“Themes of respect and stigma are at 
the moral center of the Lawrence opinion, and they are entirely new to substantive due 
process doctrine.”). 
 160 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-66.  See also Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1012 (“One 
cannot interpret or apply Lawrence without situating it in history.”). 
 161 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (“Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds.  
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, 
expression, and certain intimate conduct.  The instant case involves liberty of the 
person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.”); see also Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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My purpose here, however, is not to undertake an extensive analysis 
of what Lawrence does and does not hold.  I already weighed in on 
that debate,162 and it will no doubt continue to percolate, at least until 
the Supreme Court takes another case discussing the scope of its 
Lawrence holding.163  Rather, my enterprise here is much more 
modest.  I merely wish to emphasize a point on which most 
commentators on all sides of the debate seem to agree; that is, 
Lawrence attaches some form of heightened review when the 
government seeks to interfere with the private and personal lives of 
individuals.164  Although it is true that various forms of heightened 
scrutiny, including strict scrutiny, have been applied in the past with 
regard to specific rights within the context of the rights to be let alone, 
to personhood, and to intimate association, this article makes the 
 
 162 Accord State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 30, 34 (Kan. 2005) (finding that Lawrence 
majority, by discussing equal protection analysis in Romer and by discussing 
inevitably linked nature of equal protection and due process analysis in cases such as 
these, “at least implied that the rational basis test is the appropriate standard”); see 
Secunda, supra note 40, at 125-36 (maintaining that Lawrence Court applied “rational 
review with bite” scrutiny in overturning Texas sodomy statute). 
 163 See Secunda, supra note 40, at 162. 
 164 See, e.g., Marybeth Herald, A Bedroom of One’s Own:  Morality and Sexual Privacy 
After Lawrence v. Texas, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 29-32 (2004) (arguing that 
Lawrence is an “elegant discourse on individual autonomy and liberty” and that some 
form of heightened review is involved); Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 
MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1116-17 (2004) (reading Lawrence to extend meaningful 
constitutional protection to liberty interests without denominating them fundamental 
rights); Victor C. Romero, An “Other” Christian Perspective on Lawrence, 45 J. CATH. 
LEG. STUDS. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at n.29, on file with author) (finding that 
Lawrence Court’s use of “rational basis” refers to “rational basis with bite” because 
evidence in case suggests irrational discrimination or animus) (citing Gerald Gunther, 
Foreword:  In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:  A Model for a Newer 
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-24 (1972)); Tribe, supra note 158, at 1899 
(arguing that Court in Lawrence “implicitly reject[ed] the notion that its task was 
simply to name the specific activities textually or historically treated as protected,” 
and treated doctrine of substantive due process as reflecting “a deeper pattern 
involving the allocation of decisionmaking roles”); Martin A. Schwartz, Constitutional 
Basis of Lawrence v. Texas, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 14, 2003, at 3 (concluding that Lawrence 
Court relied on “important low-level scrutiny”); see also Williams v. Attorney Gen. of 
Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1251 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
Lawrence denominated fundamental right to sexual privacy); State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 
22, 24, 29 (Kan. 2005) (applying Lawrence and reading it as applying heightened form 
of rational basis review, rather than strict scrutiny analysis reserved for fundamental 
rights or suspect classifications, in case involving Kansas’s criminal Romeo and Juliet 
statute, which contained different penalties for heterosexual and homosexual statutory 
rape); Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1155 (2004) 
(interpreting Lawrence to hold that right to private, intimate association is 
fundamental right). 
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crucial point that Lawrence represents the first time a majority of the 
Court recognized a comprehensive preferred interest in decisional 
non-interference in private affairs due heightened scrutiny.165  And as 
a preferred liberty interest, governmental infringements of an 
individual’s interests in decisional non-interference in private affairs 
must involve the balancing of governmental efficiency concerns 
against an individual’s interest in being free from governmental 
interference in her personal and private life.166  Indeed, this is the very 
same balancing test that the Court already utilized throughout its 
unconstitutional conditions in employment cases discussed in section 
I above.167 
Therefore, until disavowed by a subsequent Supreme Court 
decision, Lawrence stands, at the very least, for an analytical approach 
that requires a heightened form of judicial scrutiny whenever the 
government seeks to interfere with the private and personal decisions 
of adult individuals.168  In other words, Lawrence “presumes an 
autonomy of self,”169 with the government’s having to put forward a 
legitimate and substantial interest to interfere with the personal and 
private decisional conduct of individuals.170  As a result, the right to 
 
 165 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“Their right to liberty under the Due Process 
Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the 
government.  ‘It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal 
liberty which the government may not enter.’”) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)); see also Stein, supra note 127, at 536 (“[I]n 
Lawrence the Court struck down state sodomy laws, reinterpreting Griswold, 
Eisenstadt, and Roe in ways that reject . . . the earlier Court’s view that there is no right 
to engage in sex outside of marriage.”). 
 166 See Secunda, supra note 40, at 136-38. 
 167 See supra Part I.B.2. 
 168 At the same time, Lawrence is equally clear concerning what it does not touch 
upon: 
The present case does not involve minors.  It does not involve persons who 
might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where 
consent might not easily be refused.  It does not involve public conduct or 
prostitution.  It does not involve whether the government must give formal 
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.  Thus, cases involving kids, prostitution, and drugs are 
generally not covered by the rights described in Lawrence.  But see Limon, 122 P.3d at 
24, 29 (finding that Kansas’s criminal Romeo and Juliet statute, which contained 
different penalties for heterosexual and homosexual statutory rape, lacked rational 
basis under guidance of Lawrence). 
 169 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
 170 Unlike some other commentators, I do not believe the right described by 
Lawrence is limited to private conduct that takes place in the sanctity of the home.  See 
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decisional non-interference in private affairs may now take its rightful 
place next to other “preferred” constitutional interests, and, when 
infringed in relation to the granting of government benefits, must be 
analyzed under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 
The next section contends that this monumental constitutional 
development in the area of substantive due process requires nothing 
less than a reformulation of the appropriate unconstitutional 
conditions test to protect these emerging constitutional interests. 
III. THE IMPACT OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS ON THE DOCTRINE OF 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
As previously illustrated, First Amendment considerations by and 
large limited the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.171  Now, after 
Lawrence, there is a new type of constitutional liberty interest:  the 
interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs, which is 
subject to some form of heightened judicial review.  As a result, public 
employers should show legitimate and substantial interests before 
interfering with the personal and private lives of their employees.  The 
next two sections elaborate on the inadequacy of the current First 
Amendment Connick/Pickering analysis for vindicating these public 
employee interests in decisional non-interference.  In its stead, they 
propose a modified Pickering test, which is consistent with other  
 
Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1399, 1400-01 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence relies on narrow version of liberty 
that is both “geographized and domesticated”).  Lawrence derives from cases where 
home and sex play a large role.  See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) 
(“Moreover, in the context of this case — a prosecution for mere possession of printed 
or filmed matter in the privacy of a person’s own home — that right takes on an added 
dimension.  For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited 
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (“Would we allow the police to 
search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of 
contraceptives?”).  Lawrence, however, is more in the tradition of Olmstead and the 
joint opinion in Casey in describing a liberty interest which is transcendental and non-
material in its dimensions.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (“The instant case involves 
liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.”) 
(emphasis added); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) 
(joint opinion) (“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”); Olmstead 
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The [founding 
fathers] knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be 
found in material things.  They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their 
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.”). 
 171 See supra Part I.C. 
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“reasonableness” tests utilized to protect public employees’ 
constitutional interests. 
A. The Incongruence Between the Interest in Decisional Non-Interference 
in Private Affairs and the Connick/Pickering Analysis 
Quite simply put, the current First Amendment model for public 
employee speech rights is inadequate to vindicate individuals’ interests 
in decisional non-interference in private affairs because of the public 
concern test.  As set out above, the current Connick/Pickering analysis 
requires at the threshold, in most cases,172 that a court consider 
whether the public employee is speaking out on a matter of public 
concern.173  Needless to say, these same concerns normally do not 
justify a public concern test in the post-Lawrence substantive due 
process rights context.  Here, the issue is not the ability of the public 
employees to speak out or express themselves on pressing social, 
political, or communal issues,174 but, quite to the contrary, the ability 
to retain a modicum of autonomy and personal space without 
jeopardizing one’s public employment.  In this regard, a case in which 
a public employer seeks to make a female employee marry her live-in 
boyfriend or else face discharge from her job does not implicate any 
real First Amendment rights.  Consequently, the test for post-Lawrence 
substantive due process rights envisioned here does not include the 
public concern test.175 
 
 172 But see Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1961-62 (2006) (holding that 
public employee official capacity speech not protected by First Amendment regardless 
of whether speech involves matter of public concern).  In light of Ceballos, there 
appears to be even more reason to develop an alternative constitutional test to protect 
these newly emergent substantive due process rights. 
 173 See supra Part I.B.2. 
 174 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (“When employee expression 
cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other 
concern to community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing 
their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in name of First 
Amendment.”). 
 175 Some may argue that something like a threshold test for Lawrence right cases is 
needed to properly take into account the increased leeway that government has in its 
employer capacity.  Nonetheless, not all constitutional balancing tests have a 
threshold test like the public concern test.  Indeed, the privacy interests of public 
employees under the Fourth Amendment have been subjected to a balancing test 
without the use of any gate-keeping or threshold test.  See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury 
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (applying balancing test in 
deciding whether drug testing of custom agents was constitutional under Fourth 
Amendment); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-18 (1989) 
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This is not to say that there might not be the infrequent case in 
which a public employee will be able to call upon both her First 
Amendment expression rights and Fourteenth Amendment 
substantive due process rights.  This is because there could be 
instances where an employee is both seeking to express herself on a 
matter of public concern, while at the same time seeking a measure of 
personal space for her private conduct.176  For an example of one of 
these rare cases, consider Melzer v. Board of Education (NAMBLA),177 
which concerned the rights of a public school teacher pedophile to 
advocate on his free time for the legalization of man-boy sexual 
relationships.178  Not only were his First Amendment free speech 
rights at issue under Connick/Pickering,179 but one could argue that his 
interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs might have 
also been at stake, as long as he was not seeking to commit the 
criminal act of child molestation.180  On the other hand, there appear 
 
(applying balancing test to determine whether drug testing of railroad employees 
recently involved in accidents is constitutional under Fourth Amendment); Knox 
County Educ. Ass’n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(applying balancing test to determine whether public high school teachers could be 
tested for drugs consistent with Fourth Amendment). 
 176 It appears that if one had the choice of frameworks, one might choose the 
Connick/Pickering line of cases because these cases recognize that political speech is at 
the heart of the First Amendment.  See Connick, 461 U.S. at 145 (“The explanation for 
the Constitution’s special concern with threats to the right of citizens to participate in 
political affairs is no mystery. The First Amendment ‘was fashioned to assure 
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes 
desired by the people.’”) (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); N.Y. 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).  On the other hand, although this 
article maintains that there is a heightened interest surrounding the right to decisional 
non-interference in private affairs after Lawrence, the relative importance of these 
rights on the constitutional spectrum still remains to be determined and, thus, is 
almost certainly not at the level of political speech rights. 
 177 See 336 F.3d 185, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1183 (2004).  
NAMBLA refers to the “North American Man/Boy Love Association.” 
 178 See id. 
 179 Indeed, the NAMBLA member, Melzer, lost his case under the Connick/Pickering 
analysis.  See id. at 200. 
 180 To be clear, this analysis assumes, as the Court did, that Melzer did not base his 
claim on the right to engage in criminal pedophilia.  See id. at 189 (“[T]he record 
before us reveals no evidence that plaintiff engaged in any illegal or inappropriate 
conduct at [his public school].  Plaintiff’s outlet as a pedophile is his participation in 
NAMBLA, which he joined in 1979 or 1980 to discuss with others his long-standing 
attraction to young boys.”).  If Melzer had engaged in such criminal conduct away 
from work, his actions would not be saved by his heightened substantive due process 
under Lawrence.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 577, 578 (2003) (“The present case 
does not involve minors.  It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced 
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to be abundant factual scenarios under which interests in decisional 
non-interference in private affairs will be the only way to vindicate a 
public employee’s constitutional rights.181 
In short, the point of this brief section is merely to make evident 
what may already be obvious to many.  An employee’s interest in 
decisional non-interference by her employer may infrequently be 
synonymous with that employee’s First Amendment rights.  
Nevertheless, there is a substantially larger category of cases in which 
the employee can only depend on an interest in decisional non-
interference in private affairs.  It is these cases which require a 
reconstructed doctrinal model to vindicate these post-Lawrence 
substantive due process rights. 
B. A New Model:  The Modified Pickering Analysis 
1. The Basics 
Even without the public concern test of Connick, the Pickering 
balancing test must be altered to meet the decisional autonomy 
concerns of public employees.  As presently stated, the test balances 
the interests of the employee as citizen in speaking out on matters of 
public concern and the state’s interest as an employer in running an 
efficient government service.182  The state’s interests in this regard 
generally remain the same183 and, more specifically, include the 
government’s interest in having loyal subordinates, in having co-
workers who can work together, in maintaining a favorable public 
image in the community, and in fulfilling its public mission.184 
 
or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused.”). 
 181 Some common examples would include instances in which public employees 
were terminated from their jobs for having a live-in boyfriend, being gay, for seeking 
an abortion, or for using contraception.  Other examples might include instances in 
which a public employee is fired for visiting a gay bar, participating in an adult 
Internet chat room, or for engaging in even more risqué off-duty conduct.  See infra 
Part III.B. 
 182 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 183 See Solove, supra note 14, at 2 (observing that governmental interests in such 
balancing tests “are often much more readily articulated”). 
 184 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. 
at 570-73).  As Kozel has perceptively argued, Pickering is really about an employee 
not engaging in speech or conduct which causes a substantial disruption to the 
employer.  See Kozel, supra note 79, at 1019 (“The Pickering/Connick doctrine 
collapses into little more than the constitutionalization of a heckler’s veto.”); see also 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (also relying upon 
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On the other side of the ledger, the employee’s interests need to be 
substantially redefined.  The emphasis is no longer on the ability of 
the employee-citizens to speak out or express themselves on matters of 
public concern.  Instead, the issue is being free from unwanted 
governmental intrusions with respect to decisions relating to matters 
concerning one’s private and personal life, especially in matters 
pertaining to sex.185  Specifically, a government employee should be 
able “to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted 
governmental intrusions into [his or her] privacy.”186  Moreover, there 
should be a “zone of autonomy, of presumptive immunity to 
governmental regulation.”187  As such, anytime the government as 
employer seeks to justify an intrusion into an employee’s sacrosanct 
zone of decisional non-interference, a legitimate and substantial 
justification must be set forth.188 
Thus, the modified Pickering balancing test for public employees’ 
substantive due process rights should balance the employee’s interest 
as citizen in being free from unwanted and unjustified governmental 
intrusions into the employee’s personal and private life against the 
government’s interest as employer in running an efficient 
governmental service for the public’s benefit.189  At times, this balance 
will obviously be strongly in favor of either the government or the 
employee, depending on whether the employee’s off-duty actions have 
any impact on the employer.  If there is no impact, analogizing to the 
Court’s conclusion in NTEU,190 the employee’s interests will normally 
prevail.191  Also, easy cases will involve instances in which the 
 
“substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities” in regulating 
political speech of students in school). 
 185 See Solove, supra note 14, at 555-62. 
 186 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (discussing privacy rights in 
First Amendment context). 
 187 See Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1411 (1974) 
(emphasis added). 
 188 See supra note 16. 
 189 To reiterate, even though the Pickering case analogy is utilized to label this test, 
the modified Pickering analysis would only apply to constitutional balancing of 
employees’ substantive due process rights and government employers’ efficiency 
concerns, not to First Amendment cases concerning freedom of speech, expression, or 
association.  See supra note 20. 
 190 See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 
465 (1995) (finding that employee speech had no adverse impact on government 
employment, and, thus, government had no legitimate interest in regulating employee 
speech). 
 191 See id. (“Neither the character of the authors, the subject matter of their 
expression, the effect of the content of their expression on their official duties, nor the 
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employee is engaging in a certain line of private conduct explicitly not 
protected by Lawrence, such as cases involving minors or commercial 
conduct like prostitution.192 
The more numerous and difficult cases will fall somewhere in 
between these antipodes.  For these more intricate cases, it is helpful 
to consider the “nexus test” used for employee discharges by labor 
arbitrators in the union environment.  As described elsewhere,193 the 
general principle is that an employer should not be able to interfere 
with an employee’s life outside of work unless there is more than a de 
minimis adverse impact on the employer’s work place.194  This impact 
can be measured based on the detriment to the employer’s public 
image, the inability of the worker to interact with her co-employees, or 
the employee’s simple inability to carry out the essential functions of 
her position as a result of her private conduct.195  But outside of these 
types of legitimate and substantial justifications for interference in an 
employee’s private life, a government employer should be constrained 
by the liberty interest contained in the substantive component of the 
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from 
interfering with their employees’ personal and private lives. 
2. The Coherency Between the Modified Pickering Test and Other 
Constitutional Protections Afforded Public Employees 
In establishing this modified Pickering analysis to protect the 
interests of public employees in decisional non-interference in private 
affairs, this article by no means draws upon a blank slate.  Instead, it  
 
kind of audiences they address have any relevance to their employment.”). 
 192 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 193 See Paul M. Secunda, Getting to the Nexus of the Matter:  A Sliding Scale Approach 
to Faculty-Student Consensual Relationship Policies in Higher Education, 55 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 55, 68-73 (2004). 
 194 See id. at 69; see also Kozel, supra note 79, at 1051 (noting that Supreme Court 
has made distinction in public employee speech cases based on whether speech or 
expression in question included any indicia of speaker’s employment). 
 195 See Secunda, supra note 193, at 70 (citing W.E. Caldwell Co., 28 Lab. Arb. Rep. 
(BNA) 434, 436-37 (1957) (Kesselman, Arb.)).  Compare Bd. of County Comm’rs v. 
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (“The government needs to be free to terminate 
both employees and contractors for poor performance, to improve the efficiency, 
efficacy, and responsiveness of service to the public, and to prevent the appearance of 
corruption.”), with Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he Government’s interest . . . is the maintenance of employee 
efficiency and discipline. . . .  To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have 
wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and internal 
affairs.”). 
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takes its cues directly from other areas of constitutional law in which 
the constitutional rights of public employees are also at stake. 
In this regard, one needs look no further for an apt analogy than 
cases concerning the permissibility of drug testing public 
employees.196 Although these cases involve a Fourth Amendment 
analysis regarding the reasonableness of the search and seizure 
involved,197 many of the same concerns animating the discussion in 
this paper are also apparent in the Fourth Amendment context. 
For example, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the 
question presented was whether federal custom agents could be 
subjected to drug urinalysis testing as a condition of their being 
promoted or transferred.198  Using the administrative search criterion 
and the “special needs” test under the Fourth Amendment,199 the court 
engaged in a constitutional balancing test based on a reasonableness 
standard.200  The court noted that the immediacy of the government’s 
 
 196 See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 
(1989) (permitting suspicionless drug search of Federal Customs agents); Skinner v. 
Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989) (upholding federal regulations 
requiring employees of private railroads to produce urine samples for drug testing 
upon occurrence of accident);  Knox County Educ. Ass’n v. Knox County Bd. of 
Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 384 (6th Cir. 1998) (permitting drug testing of public school 
teachers), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 812 (1999).  But cf. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 
322 (1997) (striking down drug testing requirements for candidates for high public 
office in Georgia). 
 197 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and seizure, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”).  The Supreme Court has already settled that the Fourth 
Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches conducted by the 
government, even when the government acts as an employer.  See O’Connor v. Ortega, 
480 U.S. 709, 714-15 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
 198 489 U.S. at 659. 
 199 A government search must normally be supported by a warrant issued upon 
probable cause.  See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).  However, neither 
a warrant nor probable cause, nor any measure of individualized suspicion, is an 
indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance.  See New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 
506-61 (1976).  In administrative searches, for instance, the government is able to 
proceed without a search warrant when the “special needs” of the search so require.  
See, e.g., Ortega, 480 U.S. at 722 (need of employer to enter employee’s office, desk, or 
files comprises “special need” and no warrant is required); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 
(finding warrant requirement unsuited to school context because it unduly interferes 
with maintenance of swift and informal disciplinary procedures). 
 200 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66 (“Where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves 
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concern and the minimal nature of the intrusion outweighed the 
individual’s privacy interest and permitted the government to drug test 
custom agents.201  The importance in ensuring that these federal 
employees were drug free was paramount because these custom 
officers carried guns and interdicted drugs.202 
Similarly, in the context of substantive due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a comparable, finely attuned balancing of 
interests test could be applied.  As in Von Raab, the context of the 
employee’s job should be given substantial weight in determining the 
justification of an intrusion.203  For instance, police officers and other 
public officials who deal with guns and other sensitive information 
could be subjected to more intrusive searches than, say, your average 
civilian clerk for a municipality.204  On the other hand, especially after 
Lawrence, just because an employee is employed by law enforcement 
does not mean that the employer should dictate every aspect of how 
that employee chooses to live her private life.205  In fact, Lawrence itself 
makes clear that the morality of one’s employer will generally not be 
sufficient to outweigh an employee’s substantial interests in making 
important life decisions unrestricted by governmental interference.206 
 
special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is 
necessary to balance the individual’s privacy expectations against the Government’s 
interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of 
individualized suspicion in the particular context.”). 
 201 Id. at 677 (“In sum, we believe the Government has demonstrated that its 
compelling interests in safeguarding our borders and the public safety outweigh the 
privacy expectations of employees who seek to be promoted to positions that directly 
involve the interdiction of illegal drugs or that require the incumbent to carry a 
firearm.”). 
 202 See id. at 672 (“We think Customs employees who are directly involved in the 
interdiction of illegal drugs or who are required to carry firearms in the line of duty 
likewise have a diminished expectation of privacy in respect to the intrusions 
occasioned by a urine test.”). 
 203 See id. at 671 (“[I]t is plain that certain forms of public employment may 
diminish privacy expectations even with respect to such personal searches.”). 
 204 Accord id. at 671 (“Employees of the United States Mint, for example, should 
expect to be subject to certain routine personal searches when they leave the 
workplace every day.  Similarly, those who join our military or intelligence services 
may not only be required to give what in other contexts might be viewed as 
extraordinary assurances of trustworthiness and probity, but also may expect intrusive 
inquiries into their physical fitness for those special positions.”). 
 205 See Hartsoe, supra note 96, at A06 (describing actions of North Carolina sheriff 
in forcing dispatcher to choose between her job and living together with her 
boyfriend). 
 206 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (upholding Justice Stevens’s view in his 
Bowers dissent that “the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally 
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In short, current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence surrounding 
drug testing of public employees lends support to the modified 
Pickering analysis articulated in this paper. 
IV. APPLYING THE MODIFIED PICKERING TEST:  OF PORNOGRAPHIC 
POLICEMEN, SWINGING SCHOOL TEACHERS, AND SALACIOUS SHERIFF 
DISPATCHERS 
How will the modified Pickering balance actually work in practice?  
In order to see how this new analysis will play out in a real world case, 
one only has to look at the case of the pornographic policeman.  
Therefore, the first section of this Part asks whether this new test 
would have made any difference in the outcome of City of San Diego v. 
Roe.  Concluding that the outcome of this case would most likely have 
been the same, the second section predicts that the ascendancy of 
public employees’ interests in decisional non-interference in private 
affairs post-Lawrence will greatly increase their protection from 
illegitimate and arbitrary interference into their private and personal 
lives by their government employers. 
A. Of Pornographic Policemen 
1. Applying the Connick/Pickering First Amendment Analysis 
To jog the reader’s memory, the case of the pornographic policeman 
in San Diego v. Roe207 involved whether John Roe could engage in 
pornographic activities outside of his police work.208  The Supreme 
Court carried out a straightforward First Amendment 
Connick/Pickering analysis.209  More specifically, the Court concluded 
that John Roe’s conduct did not deserve First Amendment protection 
 
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice”). 
 207 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam). 
 208 See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text. 
 209 In applying the Connick/Pickering analysis to this case, the Court found that the 
NTEU case does not stand for the proposition that “off-the-job, non-employment-
related speech should generally merit strong protection under the Pickering balancing 
test.”  See Kozel, supra note 79, at 1050.  Instead, the John Roe Court foreclosed the 
idea that NTEU created a presumption in favor of protecting off-duty speech or 
expression by refusing to apply NTEU to the facts of John Roe.  See John Roe, 543 U.S. 
at 81-82.  The important distinction between the two cases is that NTEU involved 
speech on matters of public concern while John Roe clearly did not.  See id. 
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under either the NTEU or Connick/Pickering line of cases.210 
Under NTEU, involving the honoraria ban for federal employees, the 
Court observed that even if one concedes that John Roe was speaking 
on a matter of public concern, which he was not, NTEU is not the 
appropriate precedent.211  That is because the speech and expression of 
the federal employees in NTEU had absolutely nothing to do with their 
federal employment.212  Of course, it goes without saying that under 
such circumstances, the balance between government interests and 
employee interests swings wildly in the employee’s favor.  On the 
other hand, John Roe unstintingly attempted to take advantage of his 
status as a law enforcement officer to pad his own pocket through 
pornographic activities.  For instance, not only was John Roe selling 
old San Diego police uniforms on eBay,213 but he listed in his personal 
profile online that he was “employed in the field of law 
enforcement.”214  Also, and quite damningly, the pornographic tape 
that he unwittingly sold to an undercover detective depicted him in a 
non-affiliated police uniform engaging in police activities and sex acts 
at the same time.215  Finally, even though John Roe used a fake AOL 
account name and did not disclose his name on eBay (going so far as 
to set up a private mailbox for his pornographic business in northern 
California),216 he was readily identifiable by individuals who worked 
with him (including the sergeant who reported him).217 
Moreover, and as the John Roe Court actually held, John Roe’s 
conduct clearly did not “qualify as a matter of public concern under 
any view of the public concern test.”218  Thus, under both NTEU and 
Connick/Pickering, the per curiam decision is rightly decided under the 
First Amendment. 
 
 210 See id. 
 211 See id. (“The present case falls outside the protection afforded in NTEU.”). 
 212 See id. at 81 (“The Court [in NTEU] . . . observed that none of the speech at 
issue ‘even arguably [had] any adverse impact’ on the employer.”) (quoting United 
States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995)). 
 213 See id. at 78. 
 214 Id. 
 215 See id. at 79.  In particular, the video in question showed John Roe, initially in 
police uniform, issuing a traffic ticket, only to revoke it after stripping and 
masturbating in front of the ticketed driver.  See id. 
 216 See id. at 78; Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at *2, *6, City of San 
Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (No. 03-1669), 2004 WL 1877785. 
 217 See John Roe, 543 U.S. at 78. 
 218 See id. at 84. 
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2. Applying the Modified Pickering Test to John Roe’s Substantive 
Due Process Rights 
What if the Court considered John Roe’s interest in decisional non-
interference in private affairs?219  Would the case have had a different 
outcome?  Most likely not.  Although there would have been some 
obvious differences in the analysis,220 the problem with the John Roe 
case under the modified Pickering analysis is similar to those endemic 
to any type of constitutional balancing test:  the more unpopular or 
disruptive the public employee’s off-duty conduct to the employer’s 
workplace, the more likely that the Pickering balance will favor the 
employer’s efficiency interests.221  The knowledge of John Roe’s off-
duty pornographic conduct would have caused a significant disruption 
in the San Diego police department.  Thus, it is likely that any interest 
in decisional non-interference in private affairs that John Roe had 
would have been outweighed by his employer’s legitimate and 
substantial efficiency interests.222 
Perhaps even more importantly, the John Roe facts differ from the 
substantive due process rights upheld in Lawrence in at least four 
important ways.  First, the conduct in question did not occur in the 
privacy of John Roe’s home.223  The Supreme Court appears most 
comfortable upholding liberty interests under substantive due process 
when the privacy of the home is involved.224  Second, producing the 
 
 219 John Roe filed his complaint in the Southern District of California on September 
28, 2001.  See Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing in Support of Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari at *4, City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (No. 03-1669), 2004 
WL 1378662.  Consequently, John Roe’s attorney did not have Lawrence-based 
arguments at his disposal initially and would have been foreclosed from bringing up 
any such new legal theories of recovery for the first time on appeal. 
 220 Most obviously, John Roe would not have been thrown out of court on the 
relatively easy ground that his conduct was not within the traditional realm of public 
concern.  Moreover, rather than focusing on speech rights under the First 
Amendment, the Court under the proposed test would have had to instead focus on 
John Roe’s rights to decisional non-interference in private affairs. 
 221 See Kozel, supra note 79, at 1018-19. 
 222 Roe is an even less sympathetic plaintiff because he transparently attempted to 
use the fact of his police department employment to his private advantage and to his 
employer’s detriment.  See John Roe, 543 U.S. at 84. 
 223 As discussed above, the Supreme Court has placed significant emphasis on 
whether conduct was engaged in by individuals in the privacy of their home.  See 
supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 224 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (“Would we 
allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of 
the use of contraceptives?  The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy 
surrounding the marriage relationship.”); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 
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type of pornography that John Roe produced does not involve 
engaging in an intimate, sexual relationship as part of forging a 
meaningful human relationship as Lawrence did.225  Third, law 
enforcement officers, because of the nature of their responsibilities, are 
given far less leeway in their off-duty conduct than other types of 
government workers.226  Finally, John Roe’s conduct in producing and 
distributing the pornographic videotapes was both public and 
commercial at the same time and, therefore, unlikely even to be 
covered by the interests recognized in Lawrence.227 
In short, John Roe would have most likely lost his case even if his 
interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs had been taken 
into account under a modified Pickering test.  This is because, as 
demonstrated above, the government’s efficiency concerns would 
remain at a high level, and, if anything, John Roe’s interest in 
decisional non-interference in private affairs would be minimal given 
the facts of the case. 
B. Of Swinging School Teachers and Salacious Sheriff Dispatchers 
Just because our pornographic policeman does not benefit from the 
doctrinal innovation introduced in this paper, it does not mean that 
other public employees will not gain important, additional 
constitutional protections which they currently do not have under the 
First Amendment Connick/Pickering analysis.  In order to discern the 
impact that the modified Pickering analysis and these interests in 
decisional non-interference in private affairs will have on public 
employees’ substantive due process rights under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, it is necessary to turn to a consideration of a 
number of real world and hypothetical cases to flesh out the contours 
of this analysis. 
 
U.S. 49, 65 (1973) (finding that constitutional “privacy right encompasses and 
protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, 
procreation, and child rearing”); Stein, supra note 127, at 535. 
 225 In pre-Lawrence terminology, the right to intimacy is lacking since Roe’s 
conduct did not include the forging of the bonds of a personal relationship.  See supra 
Part II.A.3. 
 226 See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1976) (“[The law enforcement] 
employer has, in accordance with its well-established duty to keep the peace, placed 
myriad demands upon the members of the police force, duties which have no 
counterpart with respect to the public at large.”). 
 227 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The present case does not 
involve . . . public conduct or prostitution.”). 
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1. The Easier Cases Under the Modified Pickering Analysis:  The 
Sheriff Dispatcher 
The easier cases under the modified Pickering analysis will involve 
well-established privacy rights that public employees had pre-
Lawrence.  For instance, an employer would run afoul of an 
employee’s interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs if 
the employer discharged the employee for using contraception or for 
having an abortion.228  Now, post-Lawrence, easier cases should also 
include those in which someone is fired for being homosexual or, for 
that matter, having any private relationships between consenting 
adults that do not adversely impact the participants’ employment.229 
The North Carolina cohabitation case currently being litigated by 
the ACLU is another prime example.230  There, a female sheriff 
dispatcher, who lived with her boyfriend, claimed that she was forced 
to quit her job by the sheriff when she would not either marry her 
boyfriend or move out of the house.231  In support of his position, the 
sheriff relied upon an 1805 “adultery and fornication” statute which 
prohibited cohabitation of unmarried persons.232  The pending lawsuit 
 
 228 These would be relatively straightforward unconstitutional conditions cases 
because the government as employer would be seeking to prevent conduct indirectly, 
i.e., the use of contraception or abortion, which it could not prevent directly through 
the conditioning of a government benefit, i.e., government employment.  See Sullivan, 
supra note 29, at 1422 (“Unconstitutional conditions problems arise when 
government offers a benefit on condition that the recipient perform or forego an 
activity that a preferred constitutional right normally protects from government 
interference.”). 
 229 Recall again the case in which a female attorney in the employ of the infamous 
Bowers was fired for being a lesbian.  See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1100 (11th 
Cir. 1997).  In 1997, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the discharge of that attorney under 
a very deferential rational basis review analysis following the Bowers precedent.  See 
id. at 1109-11.  Post-Lawrence, a court’s consideration of a public employee’s right to 
decisional non-interference in private affairs should make firing for being gay or 
lesbian an illegitimate and arbitrary factor upon which to base a discharge, and, in 
such cases, the modified Pickering balance would come out in favor of the employee.  
Accord Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1056 (arguing that, after Lawrence, state cannot tell 
gay people “that they are presumptive outlaws who can for that reason be denied civil 
service employment, licenses, and various state benefits.  Nor can the state tell gay 
people that the price of citizenship for them is to remain in the closet”); id. at 1058 
(“[M]ost of the state and local discriminations explicitly targeting lesbian and gay 
citizens ought to be suspect after Romer and Lawrence.”). 
 230 See Hartsoe, supra note 96, at A06. 
 231 See id. 
 232 See id.  The North Carolina “fornication and adultery” statute states:  “If any 
man and woman, not being married to each other, shall lewdly and lasciviously 
associate, bed and cohabit together, they shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor . . . 
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challenges the continuing validity of such cohabitation statutes post-
Lawrence.233 
Because Lawrence itself deals with consensual sex between two 
individuals in the privacy of their home,234 and because there are 
potential criminal sanctions at stake for violating the cohabitation 
statute in question,235 there can be little doubt that this case will be 
directly controlled by reference to the substantive due process rights 
discussed in Lawrence.  In this vein, and in the language of the 
modified Pickering test, the government employer cannot condition 
the benefit of public employment on an employee’s sacrificing her 
right to engage in a private relationship, especially when that 
relationship has no nexus to the employee’s work duties.236  Notice 
this would be true whether that relationship involved a heterosexual 
or homosexual relationship, or for that matter, a married or unmarried 
couple.  Thus, under the modified Pickering analysis, because the 
government’s interest in interfering with its employee’s interest in 
decisional non-interference in private affairs is not supported by a 
legitimate or substantial justification outside of the state’s own moral 
proclivities concerning unmarried men and women living together,237 
the government’s efficiency interests would be clearly outweighed by 
the individual’s interest in decisional non-interference in private 
affairs. 
2. The More Difficult Cases Under the Modified Pickering 
Analysis:  The Swinging School Teacher 
Unfortunately, many of the future cases involving interests in 
decisional non-interference will not involve the easier type of 
scenarios described in the previous section.  Instead, the majority of 
 
.”  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2005). 
 233 See Hartsoe, supra note 96, at A06. 
 234 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (observing “emerging 
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to 
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex”). 
 235 § 14-184. 
 236 See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text. 
 237 Lawrence makes clear that the promotion of a majoritarian morality is not a 
sufficient government interest to outweigh an individual’s right to freely exercise her 
rights to decisional non-interference in private affairs.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (adopting Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186, 215-20 (1986)); see also Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1045 (observing 
that Court in Lawrence found that popular disgust of homosexual sodomy could not 
supply rational basis under Due Process Clause for criminalizing homosexual 
sodomy). 
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these cases will likely require a careful analysis of both the 
governmental interests in efficiency and freedom from disruption on 
the one hand, and the strength of the employee’s post-Lawrence 
substantive due process rights on the other.  A few examples will 
suffice to establish some of the analytical intricacies that will no doubt 
occur in these complicated cases. 
For instance, consider the difficulties with any activity that a public 
employee engages in on his private or personal time that brings great 
notoriety to his employer.  In these cases, it is more likely that the 
employee would lose any subsequent constitutional balancing, as the 
disruption entailed by the employee’s private conduct would likely 
overshadow any interest in decisional non-interference that an 
employee might have.238  In this regard, consider a police officer who 
in his spare time is a porn star.  Regardless of the nature of the 
employee interests involved, the need to maintain the credibility of its 
police officers and its own reputation will probably permit the 
employer to take constitutionally permissible, adverse employment 
actions against that employee.239  Likewise, the same outcome would 
result in a case involving a public elementary school teacher who is 
exposed publicly as engaging in a swinger lifestyle outside of school.  
Because of the sensitive nature of the public school teacher’s position 
and the importance for these individuals to model appropriate 
behavior for children,240 the efficiency concerns of the public employer 
will most likely outweigh the teacher’s decisional autonomy interests 
in these circumstances as well. 
Consider another difficult set of facts.  John Doe is still a police 
officer, and thus more highly regulated, but, unlike John Roe, he does 
not engage in pornographic activities.  Instead, he films himself and 
his wife engaging in consensual sexual intercourse for their private 
use, but unfortunately the videotape is stolen by an acquaintance and 
ends up being distributed widely on the Internet.  When the police 
department learns of the tape and the adverse reaction the tape is 
 
 238 See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 239 See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84-85 (2004) (per curiam) (stressing 
importance of impact of public employee’s private conduct on “mission and 
functions” of public employer in this type of unconstitutional conditions analysis); 
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995) 
(observing that none of speech at issue “even arguably [had] any adverse impact on 
the [employer]”). 
 240 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Schs., 533 U.S. 98, 116 (2001) (observing 
“that students are susceptible to pressure in the classroom, particularly given their 
possible reliance on teachers as role models”) (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 
578, 584 (1987)). 
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causing in the community, the police officer is fired.  Under a 
modified Pickering analysis, can this police officer be constitutionally 
discharged? 
On the one hand, the carrying out of a personal relationship, 
especially in the marital bedroom,241 is due much freedom from 
governmental incursions.242  Moreover, the police officer did not wish 
for this tape to become public and the tape became public through no 
efforts of his own.  On the other hand, regardless of the police officer’s 
desire not to have this videotape placed on the Internet, the fact of the 
matter is that it now exists in cyberspace, and the officer’s credibility 
and that of his department are on the line.  If the police department 
can show substantial disruptions to its operations and that a public 
safety issue has now arisen as a result of the distractions caused by the 
scandal, the department will most likely be able to discharge the 
officer.  Nonetheless, this type of case will no doubt require a careful 
balancing by the court and may turn on such case-sensitive factors as 
the size of the municipality, the extent of the public’s knowledge of 
the tape, and the type of sexual conduct displayed on the videotape. 
Similarly, more difficult issues arise when a public employee acts as 
the public face of the employer.  This is because of the potential 
message the employer is sending to the public by keeping the 
employee in employment after the employee engages in the 
controversial conduct.243  For instance, what if the police chief is 
caught engaging in an extramarital affair off-duty and this conduct is 
made public.  Does the employer, for efficiency reasons, have more 
latitude to terminate the chief, even though the chief would appear to 
have post-Lawrence substantive due process rights to engage in 
consensual sexual relations with another person on his own time?244  
Does it depend on the geographic location in which the scenario 
occurs and that community’s mores?  Perhaps a police chief in a small, 
conservative town would be discharged, while a police chief in a large, 
 
 241 See supra note 170. 
 242 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); see also supra note 224 and accompanying 
text. 
 243 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (“The Boy Scouts has a 
First Amendment right to choose to send one message but not the other.”).  It is 
anything but clear if government institutions are expressive associations, but even if 
they are not, the modified Pickering analysis would still give credence to government 
efficiency concerns, which would include the government employer’s right to 
maintain a certain image or reputation within a community. 
 244 This scenario assumes there are no applicable statutory or common law 
prohibitions against engaging in extra-marital relationships. 
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liberal metropolitan city would face no adverse employment action.  
Should the constitutional interests in decisional non-interference in 
private affairs differ in different parts of the country?245  These are all 
very difficult questions which lower courts will have to weigh in 
deciding these complex cases. 
In short, there may sometimes be no clear-cut answers to the 
complex questions posed by these post-Lawrence cases.  Nevertheless, 
public employees are no doubt better off as a whole as a result of 
Lawrence and its elevation of the right to decisional non-interference 
in private affairs to a preferred constitutional liberty interest.  To what 
extent public employees are better off will depend to a large extent on 
how the lower federal courts interpret the scope of these interests in 
the coming years.  But at the very least, Lawrence, with the aid of the 
modified Pickering test, should provide much greater protection to 
public employees against arbitrary and meddlesome government 
overreaching that unnecessarily treads into the secret regions of their 
lives. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper argues that whatever debates continue to stew regarding 
the “true” meaning of Lawrence v. Texas, at the very least, Lawrence 
represents the recognition of an individual’s heightened interest in 
decisional non-interference in private affairs.246  This is an important 
constitutional development since a problem under the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions only arises when the government offers a 
benefit, like government employment, conditioned on the waiver of a 
preferred constitutional right.  Thus, post-Lawrence, the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions should prohibit a government employer 
from firing a government employee who exercises her interests in 
decisional non-interference in private affairs. 
The current protections for public employee speech rights under the 
Connick/Pickering analysis, however, do not adequately safeguard 
 
 245 Such an outcome would place these cases in a category similar to First 
Amendment obscenity cases in which courts utilize, in part, a contemporary 
community standards test.  See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (“The 
basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be:  (a) whether ‘the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest.”). 
 246 Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1012 (“[F]ew constitutional scholars think the 
narrowest or the broadest reading of Lawrence is correct.  Its charged reasoning cannot 
be limited to the sodomy context alone, but neither does it entail same-sex 
marriage.”). 
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these emerging interests in decisional non-interference.  The proposed 
modified Pickering test discards the unnecessary “public concern test” 
for these post-Lawrence substantive due process cases and, in the first 
instance, balances the employee’s interest in decisional non-
interference in private affairs against the government’s interest in 
operating an efficient governmental service for the public.  The 
upshot, and a much neglected impact of Lawrence, is that over twenty-
one million federal, state, and local United States’ employees should be 
the beneficiaries in coming years of a significant expansion of their 
interests in being free from arbitrary and capricious interference by 
their employers in their personal and private lives. 
